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BEYOND BLACK INK: FROM LANGDELL TO
THE OYEZ PROJECT-THE VOICE OF THE PAST
Paul R. Baier*

[T}he law is a science; ...all the available materials of that science are
1
contained in printed boo ks. Christopher Columbus Langdell, ca.1886
-

I am the Edison Phonograph created by the Great Wizard of the new

world to delight those who would have melody or be amused. I can sing
you tender songs of love. I can give you merry tales and joyous laughter. I
can transform you to the realms of music. I can call you to join in the
2
rhythmic dance
-Sound recording, ca. 1906
.

.

.

.

Beyond Langdell's black ink, lies the Oyez Project. It adds the human
voice to our pedagogy:

*

George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State

University. Judicial Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States,

1975-76.

This was the year of

my discovery of "The Supreme Court Tapes: Lively Conversations for the Classroom," as I
captioned my archeological diggings in the Sound Recordings Division of the National Archives
for a joint program of the Sections on Constitutional Law and Teaching Methods at the

1980

Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Phoenix, Arizona-a pretty good
place to launch a contemporary nova methodus, following Leipnitz

(1600):

"Reading without hearing is dark and irksome."

(1667)

and echoing Coke

I owe thanks to Yale Kamisar, whose

booming voice I first heard as a lowly Instructor in Law at Michigan Law School and whose loud
objection at Phoenix to using the sound effects of Supreme Court tapes in teaching ("Why tapes,
why not transcripts?") inspired me to keep at it for another quarter of a century, culminating of
late in a reprise of sorts: "The Palm Beach Sound Machine," for the Southeastern Association of
Law Schools Annual Meeting, Palm Beach, Fla., July

2008,

with thanks to Russell Weaver for

inviting me to join his coterie of SEALS friends.
1. Harvard Law School's first Dean, Christopher C olumbus Langdell, declared his faith at

Cambridge,

1886,

the year Hugo Lafayette Black, later Mr. Justice Black, came into this world,

the year the Statue of Liberty came into New York Harbor, viz.- "first that the Jaw is a science;
secondly, that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books." ARTHUR
E. SUTHERLAND, THE LA W AT HARVARD 175 (Harv. Univ. Press
2. To listen to this early

78

1967).

RPM sound recording, Google "I am the Edison Phonograph."

You will hear Thomas Alva Edison's technological miracle for yourself, exactly as the Great
Wizard advertised it at the tum of the Twentieth Century, a recording made at Menlo Park,
http://www.archive.org/details/iamedl906 (follow "stream" hyperlink).

This, a precursor to a

marvel of our own generation, "The Oyez Project," from the inventive brain of Jerry Goldman,
Great Wizard of Northwestern University, "The Oyez Man" as he calls himself (Google Jerry
Goldman).
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CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We 'll hear argument now in No. 00-949,

George W. Bush and Richard Cheney versus Albert Gore, et al.
Before we begin the argument, the Court wishes to commend all of the
parties to this case on their exemplary briefing under very trying
circumstances. We greatly appreciate it. Mr. Olson.
THEODORE B. OLSON, Esq.: Mr. Chief Justice, thank you, and may it

please the Court.

Just one week ago this Court vacated the Florida

Supreme Court 's November 21 revision of Florida's Election Code,

which had changed statutory deadlines, severely limited the discretion
of the State 's chief election officer; changed the meaning of words
such as "shall" and "may" into "shall not" and "may not," and
authorized extensive, standardless, and unequal manual ballot recounts
in selected Florida counties.

Just four days later, without a single

reference to this Court's December 4 ruling , the Florida Supreme
Court issued a new, wholesale post-election revision of Florida's
election law. That decision not only changed Florida election law yet
again, it also explicitly referred to, relied upon, and expanded its
November 21 judgment that this Court had made into

a

nullity.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can you begin by tellin3 us about our federal

jurisdiction. Where's the federal question here?

I. FROM LANDGELL TO THE OYEZ PROJECT
I first sounded the use of the Supreme Court tapes in teaching some

twenty-five years ago in the Journal of Legal Education. I asked, "What Is
the Use of a Law Book Without Pictures or Conversations?" I proposed a
"tapes method" of enriching the processes of l earning in the law schools.
The Supreme Court tapes, I said at first trumpeting, "capture the law in
action; they preserve the life of the judicial mind; they engage the listener in

the stream of thought that is the business of the Supreme Court. "4

The

sounds of the Supreme Court "are new intellectual capital, unmasking the
persons behind the law and extending the boundaries of knowledge and

3. Recording

of

Oral

Argument,

Bush

v.

Gore,

531

U.S.

98

(2000),

http ://oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000 00_949.
_

4. Paul R. Baier, What ls the Use of a Law Book Without Pictures or Conversations?, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 619, 632 (1984), with a facing frontispiece of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
sitting in his favorite horsehair armchair, holding a book open in his lap but looking straight at the
photographer, gazing immortally at untold future generations.

This is the first photograph of a

human being, Holmes no less, that appears in the Journal of Legal Education

P rometheus

-

unbound from the chains of black ink.

In sounding the tapes method anew for Loyola Law

Review's Tug of War Symposium, I draw freely on my plea of twenty-five years ago, lost on law
library shelves.
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understanding. "5

After a quarter of a century, the sound recordings of

Supreme Court arguments are now at our fingertips, at the click of the
mouse, on the internet. All we have to do is Google "Oyez Proj ec t," select,
by Term of Court, a favorite case for classroom instruction, and, presto, the
life of the mind, the dialectic of the Court, the voice of the past becomes a
vital tool to educate lawyers and bring up professionals "in the grand
manner," to borrow from my Master' s Voice.

I mean Oliver Wendell

Holmes, Jr. (Have you heard his ninetieth birthday radio address, March

8,

1931?)
A. HOLMES AT HARVARD

Here is what Holmes said on the 250th anniversary o f Harvard
University, his oration "The Use of Law Schools," delivered at Cambridge,
November,

1886.

"So I say the business of a law school is not sufficiently

described when you merely say that it is to teach law, or to make lawyers.
6
It is to teach law in the grand manner, and to make great lawyers. "
Christopher Columbus Langdell, first Dean o f the Harvard Law School,
was in Holmes ' s audience. Langdell's new-fangled "case method" was all
the rave-"those books of cases which were received at first by many with
a somewhat contemptuous smile" but which now, said Holmes, Jr., "bid fair
7
to revolutionize the teaching both of this country and of England."
B. GOLDMAN AT NORTHWESTERN

Thanks to the Oyez Project, we are beyond Langdell' s black ink.
Thanks to Jerry Goldman-wizard of the new world of legal education
we are able to model professional performance in our law schools by the
example of actual argument in the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Justices and members of the Supreme Court Bar come to class as
academic support, a high-tech, front-end variation on the Socratic and case
method of learning law.
_
_
Constitutional Law-"from

We

in front."

our

?

su j� ct in my ca�e
�
Our students JOtn m the rhythmic

a�proach

5. Baier, supra note 4, at 633.
6. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Use of Law Schools, Oration Before the Harvard Law
School Association at Cambridge (Nov. 5, 1886), on the 250th Anniversary of Harvard
University, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., SPEECHES 28, 30 (Little, Bro wn 1891).

7. Id. at 35. Cf MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIAS (MIT Press 1999) (1964)

("Every culture and every age has its favorite model of perception and knowledge that it is

inclined to prescribe for everybody and everything").
8. Karl N. Llewellyn,

On the Problem of Teaching "Private" Law, 54 HARV.

L. REV. 775,

793 (1941).

And muddling t hrough gets boring for them, and we wonder why the edge is off the boys in

the second year. It is off because we-as we made our instruction-books-have taken it off.
We have been known, even, to edit down or edit out the facts. We make slight effort to g e t
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dance. To paraphrase Judith Wegner only slightly, the Oyez Project makes
9
To quote her exactly, the upre� e
"the thinking process audible to all."

�

Court tapes "stretch [our] students' horizons by causing them to imagine
10
The Oyez Project nurtures
themselves in significant professional roles."
what a recent Carnegie report calls "[a]n apprenticeship of professional
11
identity."
II. I AM THE OYEZ PROJECT
I propose to bring the tapes method down to date, to give you merry

tales of law, to call you to the Oyez Project. I offer a few examples of the
tapes in action.

They enable us to escape the Old World of the casebook

and enter the New World of the Oyez Project.

Students and teachers alike

experience a Supreme Court seminar of extraordinary vitality. We hear law
in the making-"from

in front."

At the back-end, we hear judicial voices

announcing the Opinion of the Court. I can bring you Lewis Powell's soft,
12
announcing the judgment of the Court in Allen Bakke's
Virginia voice
13
I can give you William J. Brennan, Harry Blackmun, and Thurgood
case.
hold of counsel's argument, and so to present the case as an exercise in how a lawyer goes
about his job, an exercise in dealing with cases from in front. How should the edge not be
off the boys?
Id.

9. JUDITH W EGNER

,

THEORY, PRACTICE, AND THE COURSE OF STIJDY 34 (unpublished

manuscript draft 2003), quoted in ROY STUCKEY & OTHERS,
EDUCATION 165-66 (Clinical Legal Educ. Ass'n 2007).

BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL

10. WEGNER, supra note 9, at 38, quoted in STUCKEY, supra note 9, at 166.

11. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS 129 (Jossey-Bass 2007).

12. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., died a decade ago, in his Richmond, Virginia home early
Tuesday morning, August 25, 1998. That same day I played a tape recording of his swearing-in at
the Supreme Court, a treasured piece of audio tape unearthed years earlier on a field-trip with my
The day he died, Lewis Powell's soft,

students to the Court and to the National Archives.

Southern voice was heard in my constitutional law seminar at LSU Law Center. This seemed to
us a good way to pay our respects. He botched his oath of office, an innocent slip, my students
know. The Court's official report, Appointment
7,

1972),

of Mr.

Justice Powell, 404 U.S. xi-xiii (Fri., Jan.

recites the oath in its entirety without the slip.

For details, see Paul R. Baier, Lewis F.

Powell, Jr., 1907-1998: Remembrances from LSU Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 409 (1999). It seems only
yesterday when I first saw Justice Powell's tall, lean, handsome figure walking the marble halls of
the Court, very quietly, very peacefully, late in the afternoon as was his custom, a respite from the
workload of cha mbers. He was wearing hush puppies.
13.

Oyez,

Oyez, Oyez-

As the Chief Justice has stated, I am authorized to announce only the judgment of the Court.
The facts in this case are too well known to be restated this mo rning. Perhaps no case in
modem memory has received as much media coverage and scholarly commentary. More
than sixty briefs were filed with the Court. We also have received the advice through the
.

media and commentaries of countless extrajudicial advocates. The case was argued some
eight months ago and as we speak today with a notable lack of unanimity, it may be fair to
say that we needed all of this advice. In any event it will be evident from the several
opini ons that the case, intrinsically difficult, has received our most thoughtful attention over
many months. So much for an introduction. As there are six separate opinions I will state
first the Court's judgment. . .
'

.
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Marshall's oral dissents in the same cause, leurs eris du cC£ur, over the
14
meaning of Equal Protection of the Laws.
I am the Oyez Project.
A. SIR EDWARD COKE

"[R]eading without hearing is dark and irksome,"

15

said my Lord

Coke, his instructions to law students, when Elizabeth I was on the throne.
Doubtless Sir Edward Coke would marvel at the Oyez Project.
even Christopher Columbus Langdell would supplement his

Perhaps

Contracts

casebook. Have you heard of another Marshall, not Thurgood Marshall, not
John Marshall, but Marshall McLuhan? He would say the Oyez Project is
16
the pre-eminent "hot medium" of constitutional law.
I know from
personal experience that Harvard Law School Dean Erwin N. Griswold,
sixth in Langdell's line, marveled at the Supreme Court tapes and the active
voice of the Court. I played the
law office.

Pentagon Papers

argument to him in his

This was my first pedagogical demonstration, so to speak

quite a classroom-at Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Metropolitan Square,
Washington, D.C.

As Solicitor General o f the United States Erwin

Recording of Oral Argument, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970- l 979/l 977/1977_ 76_ 811/. You hear nothing of Lewis F. Powell,
Jr.'s soft, Richmond, Virginia voice and his quiet candor in this cold transcript. The human voice
of the Court, the humanity of our law, is the Oyez Project's golden gift. It is the Supreme Court's
Edison Phonograph.
14. Recording of Oral Argument, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
http://www .oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_811/ (Oral dissents of Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Marshall, in turn). This is almost as good as hearing the first Justice Harlan
announce his dissent, all alone, in Plessy v. Ferguson. It's too bad that Wizard Goldman and his
Oyez Project were not around in 1896. Jerry G. was not yet of this world. And Hugo Lafayette
Black was only ten years old. On the contemporary legal stage, Harvard Law School's Lani
Guinier has recently broadcast the pedagogical potential of oral dissents beyond the classroom:
"speaking to and empowering the people." Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through
Dissent, 122 HARV L. REV. 4, 137 (2008). By their oral dissents, Justices such as William 0.
Douglas, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer
[A]re inviting the public into the hallowed halls of the courtroom, transforming an elite stage
into a democratic agora. In this tradition, Justices teach the public to identify with the
constitutional values at stake and invite them to speak back in a voice that is all their own .. .
They do this by speaking . . . directly to the people in a language they can understand.
Id. at 137-38. Professor Guinier points out that oral dissents are not widely broadcast and the
audio tapes are available on the Oyez Project as late as October of the following Term. Id. "As a
result of the Court's resistence to twenty-first-century technology, most oral dissents do not yet
realize their demosprudential potential." Id. at 54. She adds an optimistic comment, however,
directly apposite Loyola Law Review's Tug of War Symposium: "Yet the technology of their
dissemination is ripe for change." Id.
.

15. Sir Edward Coke so exclaimed more than four hundred years ago. 1 COKE REP. :xxvm
(1600), quoted in WALTER CECIL RICHARDSON, A HISTORY OF THE INNS OF COURT 193
(Claitor's 1975).
16. See generally McLUHAN, supra note 7, at 22 ("Media Hot and Cold").
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Griswold argued the Pentagon Papers Case for the Government. During
the argument he confronted Justice Hugo Black from the rostrum of the
Supreme Court. They were face to face, voice to voice, over the meaning
of the First Amendment. We will listen to their tug of war a little later in
. 17
this Loyola Law Review teehno 1ogy repnse.
What I want to say at this point is that Dean Griswold confronted me
with a grave look.

He usually looked grave, but this was very grave. He

asked me, incredulously, "Where did you get these tapes?" The reader may
recall the Pentagon P apers were stamped, "Top Secret." What about these
Supreme Court tapes? Well, I calmed the Dean down when I told him the
sound recordings of oral argument were available, with the High Court's
permission, from the National Archives for use by scholars and teachers.
"Oh, all right."
I learned that this quintessential Harvard Law School Dean, sometime

Solicitor General of the United States, Erwin N. Griswold, had never heard
of the tapes, much less heard his own argument.

I explained to him that I

had the Court's permission. I told him I use his exchange with Justice
Black in teaching constitutional law.
After our class at Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Dean Griswold walked
me to the elevator far from his corner office.

This was his old-school

c ustom. The offices are a labyrinth. It's easy to get lost. As the elevator
door closed, he exhorted me, "How are you going to get these tapes into the
hands of law teachers?" I have been at it ever since.
B. HOLMES ONCE MORE

To recur to Holmes once more: "Why look at it simply in the light of
human nature. Does not a man remember a concrete instance more vividly
than a general principle? ...than when you merely see it lying dead before
18
We join the Justices in their working
you on the printed page."
laboratory, "Open to the Public." I mean the crucible of oral argument.
19
Our learning is in depth. This is livelier than Professor Agassiz's Natural

17. In his memoirs, Dean Griswold reports, "Undoubtedly the most spectacular case in which I
appeared was the one involving the 'Pentagon Pa pers."'

NEW CORNE 296

ERWIN

N. GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS,

(West Publ'g Co. 1992). "A friend of mine, P rofessor Paul R. Baier of the Law

School of Louisiana State University, obtained a copy of this recording, and made it avai lable to
me.

Every four or five years or so, I get this tape out and play it.

It brings back interesting

memories." Id. at 307.
18. Holmes, Jr., supra note 6, at 36.
19. "Because 'depth' means 'in inter-relation,' not in isolation. Depth means insight, not point
of view; and insight is a kind of mental involvement in process that makes the content of the item
seen quite secondary.

Consciousness itself is an inclusive process not at all dependent on

content." McLUHAN, supra note 7, at 282-83.
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History Museum a t Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Fossil
fish don't talk back. Justice Scalia does.
Recent scholarship, including the brilliant p anning of the Oyez Project
20
by your own Professor Stephen Higginson, suggests that oral argument is
a pretty good indication of what is to come, both at the Court's private
conference and, in due course, in the United States Reports.

Of course,

Professor Higginson is right to say that our understanding of constitutional
law is deepened by reference to constitutional advocacy. Our scholarship
should attend to the front-end of constitutional law, not just to the back
21
end.
What I am here to broadcast, however, is not the underpinnings of
doctrine, but the pedagogical, front-end, truth of the Oyez Project.
audible, free, and available at our fingertips in our wired classrooms.

It is
Let

the word go forth : "OYEZ, 0YEZ, OYEZ."
C. BEYOND BLACK INK

Going beyond black ink adds life to our learning. The tapes are living
law. Our classroom comes alive. Voices of the past teach the great lesson
that law is human. To know constitutional law, we must listen to the voices
22
that make it.
The Supreme Court tapes are a pirate's treasure chest of
judicial personalities.

They record competing judicial philosophies ready

20. Stephen A. Higginson, Constitutional Advocacy Explains Constitutional Outcomes, 60
FLA.L. REV. 857, 857 (2008). Professor Higginson and Jerry Goldman have teamed up to offer
multimedia articles featuring audio clips of Supreme Court arguments that wire for sound
Professor Higginson's radiant scholarship.

See, and hear also, Stephen Higginson, Thurgood

Marshall: Cases in Controversy, 15 GEO. MASONL. REV. 741, 741 (2008). For a groundbreaking
empirical study of the link between oral argument and Supreme Court decision-making, see
TIMOTHY

R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENT AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES

SUPREMECOURT(State Univ. ofNew York Press 2004).
21. My colleague, former Dean of Vanderbilt Law School and Chancellor Emeritus of LSU
Law Center, John Costonis's scholarship of late on the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and
Louisiana's constitutional knee-jerk reaction to Keio v. City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005),
was heightened by his first encounter with the Oyez Project's audio recording of the oral argument

in Keio, which

I had recommended to him.

Coming at Keio from "in fronf' deepened his

understanding beneath and beyond the published opinion, adding nuance to his scholarship.

"Although I had previously read the Keio opinion many, many times, I simply would not have

picked up on this nuance (with its fundamental reshaping influence on my thinking), but for
Oyez."

E-mail from John Costonis, former Dean of Vanderbilt Law School and Chancellor

Emeritus ofLSULaw Center, to author
with permission of John Costonis).

(Jan. 08, 2009,

16:41 CST) (on file with author) (printed

For the resulting black ink, see John J. Costonis, Katrina,

Keio and New Orleans: American Cities in the Post-Keio Era, 83

TuL.L. REV. 395 (2008). Oyez,

Oyez, Oyez, ye Scholars.

22. Cf Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice on Court, N.Y. TIMES,
October Term, 2006 "will be remembered as a time when J ustice Ruth

May 31, 2007, at A l . The

Bader Ginsburg found her voice, and used it."
(citing same).

Id.; see also Guinier, supra note 14, at 23 n.93
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for instant playback.

23

Constitutional advocacy determines constitutional

Mapp v.
outcomes, usually. But sometimes, we must go deeper still.
24
Ohio is a good example. You will hear Justice Tom Clark-Texas Voice

of Common Sense-later on our Pine Street Juke Box.

I trust you

remember what he said in his opinion on behalf of Dolree Mapp: "There is
.
.
,,25
no war between t he Const1tutton and common sense.
My purpose here is to report my experience using the Oyez Project as
a teaching tool, to give you a few examples of classroom use, and to
suggest ways in which other teachers of the law, regardless of their subject
matter, may do likewise.

I hope to contribute my own insight to all the

table talk of late of educating lawyers and best practices.

There is a vital

place, I submit, for the Supreme Court tapes-for the legal clinic of the
Court-in the professional development of our law students.
Like the Edison Phonograph, I invite you to join the rhythmic dance.
"Can you begin by telling us about our federal jurisdiction?"

Here is a

method that adds life to Professor Henry Hart's federal courts class at
Harvard Law School as I remember it.

God bless Henry Hart. He is gone.

So is William Rehnquist, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William Brennan,
Potter Stewart, Harry Blackmun, William 0. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall,
Lewis Powell.

Take your pick.

Do you have any judicial heroes?

Our

students live by example, do they not? Let me avouch Archibald Cox, my
teacher at Harvard Law School, as witness:
In the end, young men and women do not set their compasses solely
or even chiefly-by courses of formal instruction. . . . Much used to
be done by portraying great figures in Anglo-American Law: Coke,
Erskine, Marshall, Story, Evarts, Rufus Choate, Clarence Darrow,
Holmes, and Brandeis. The list goes on and on. Today one would add
Robert

Jackson,

Hugo

Thurgood Marshall,
colleagues, but I

Black,

Earl

and many others.

W arren,
I

Felix

Frankfurter,

cannot speak for my

have failed to present the examples that my

classmates and I admired as Austin Scott, Felix Frankfurter, and

23. Following Steve Allen's precedent, his

"Meeting of Minds" televis ion program, I

produced a television program featuring judicial table talk between Justices Hugo L. Black and
Justice John Marshall Harlan.
class.

They voice their competing judicial philosophies for playback in

Two of my students portray Justices Black and Harlan, after extensive study of their

opinions and extra-judicial writings.

After we view the video, the entire class participates in a

round-table question and answer session, featuring Justices Black and Harlan, who join us "live
and in person" in class as guest teachers. Pedagogues extol this as role playing.

Vide Paul

R.

Baier, Hugo Lafayette Black and John Marshall Harlan: Two Faces of Constitutional Law, With

Some Notes on the Teaching of Thayer's Subject, 9 S.U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25. Id. at 657.
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Edmund Morgan presented them to us. The mood has seemed against
History and heroes seem to command little attention from the
26
"now" generation. I would like to have the opportunity back.

it.

And what of Erwin Griswold, Alexander Bickel, Archibald Cox,
Frederick Bernays Wiener, and a host of exemplary counsel whose voices
bring master advocates to our classes. Their clashing faiths live on, on tape.
I like to have the voice of the past as part of our learning.

So do my

students.
Beyond Langdell' s black ink, let me trumpet anew, lies the Oyez
Project.
III. PINE STREET PHONOGRAPH
Each Spring, when Audubon Park blossoms, I play my Pine Street
Phonograph for Loyola Law School's Skills Curriculum under the watchful
eye of its Director and my friend for fifteen seasons, Pat Phipps.

Justice

Harry T. Lemmon, a favorite son of Loyola University, Associate Justice of
the Louisiana Supreme Court, retired, joins me in class. We call our skills
course, "Lawyers i n the Great Tradition: The Argument of an Appeal."
Here is an obvious use of the Supreme Court tapes and the Oyez Project,
both in and out of class-the training of vital skills of oral advocacy by the
example of masters at the Bar. You have already heard the hammer blows
of Theodore Olson's opening argument in Bush

v.

Gore. After his opening,

what is left to decide? That's the way to do it.
As for our featured Loyola s kills exemplars, let me say I was
mesmerized when I first heard Frederick Bernays Wiener's argument in

Reid v. Covert,27 which he won on rehearing in the Supreme Court of the
United States, the only instance in over two hundred years of the Supreme
Court reversing itself, without a controlling change in membership, in the
28
"REID v. COVERT II

same case following a published adverse opinion.

26. Archibald Cox, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1182-83 (1979) (reviewing JOEL
SELIGMAN THE HIGH CI TADE L : THE INFLUENCE OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (Houghton,
Mifflin 1978)).
,

27. 354 U.S. I (1957) (on rehearing).
28. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, Persuading the Supreme Court to Reverse Itself: Reid v.
Covert, 14 LITIG. 6, 6 (1988).
In the 198 years that the Supreme Court of the United States has sat since it first convened in
New York on February 1, 1790, it has only once reached a different result in the same
litigation following a published opinion and without a controlling change in membership.
That was in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which held unconstitutional the trial by court
martial of servicemen's dependents in time of peace, and which, accordingly, withdrew the
earlier opinion sustaining such trials, rendered just 364 days earlier in Kinsella v. Krueger,
351 U.S. 470 (1956), and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).

Id.
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(VICTORY)," as Fritz Wiener's leather-bound brief recites in gold

[Vol. 55
leaf on its

spine, held unconstitutional an act of Congres s subjecting Mrs. Clarice B.
Covert ' a civilian wife ' to trial by court martial for murdering her .soldier
29
.
husband on a military base overseas in time of peace. She was entitled to
30
is how
trial by jury, not trial by soldier. The advocate's "dream case,"
Colonel Wiener, U.S. Army retired, describes it. His peroration in Reid v.
3i
Covert II blossoms out each Spring on Pine Street. It continues to inspire,
32
just as the bronze "Advocate's Prayer" to St. Thomas More in the foyer of
your Pine Street building continues to inspire me: "Pray that, for the greater
glory of God and in the pursuit of His justice, I be able in argument ...."
But beyond the obvious use of the tapes to sharpen advocacy skills,
the Oyez Project is a doctrinal tool of extraordinary vitality in class. Let me
demonstrate this by playing a half dozen or so of my favorite excerpts from
a variety of constitutional angles: the scope of judicial power, judicial
supremacy, separation of powers, substantive due process, procedural due
p rocess, equal protection, freedom of the press. I could go on, but I won't.
Leipnitz published his essay Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque
33
in 1667. I like to tell my friends that in using the Oyez

Jurisprudentiae

Project in class I am following Leipnitz.

I have my own twenty-first

century nova methodus, a veritable post-Langdellian Sound Machine. True,
I teach constitutional law. It is in this field, pre-eminently, that the Oyez
Project is a miracle. It enables all Americans to hear their Supreme Court
in action ("Your Supreme Court," Harry Black.mun used to say). But the
tapes method can be used to enliven other classrooms regardless of subject
matter, provided the assigned casebook includes Supreme Court opinions.
If there is

a

dissent, let us say from Justice Breyer in a labor law case, as

29. "[T]he miracle had come to pass." Wiener, supra note 28, at 10.
30. Frederick Bernays Wiener, Advocacy at Military Law: The Lawyer's Reason and the

Soldier's Faith, 80 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6, 10 (1978) ("The Advocate's Dream: Turning A Court
Around on Rehearing").

31. See 52 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 859-60 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1975).

32. Erected by the Saint Thomas More Law Society, Loyola University New Orleans School

of Law, with thanks to Pat Phipps for reciting the prayer over the telephone so that I could use the
opening part herein.
33. John Henry Wigmore, Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae,

30

HARV. L. REV. 812, 813 (1917). Leipnitz was but twenty-one years old at the time he published
his essay; "the vast science of law was thus (in Hallam's phrase) 'invaded by a b oy."'

Id.

His

Nova Methodus anticipated the polemic moots at Harvard Law School, projected a "Theatrum
Legale," which sounds good to me [cf Paul R. Baier, "Father Chief Justice": E. D. White and the

Cons tituti on, 58 LA. L. REV. 423 (1998)], and, "curiously enough, the Socratic method, as applied
m the Harvard Law School under Ames and Keener, is foreshadowed in his preface." Wigmore,

supra at 813.
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against a majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, select excerpts of
oral argument are likely to add brain fire to whatever colloquy passes
34
between teacher and student in class.
What, after all, is a classroom, I
35
might ask Yale Kamisar, of booming voice himself, if not a sound stage?
Now for a few cuts from our Pine Street Phonograph, courtesy of the
Oyez Project and its Great Wizard Jerry Goldman.

34. I have in mind Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.

v.

NLRB,

535 U.S. 137 (2002), with

thanks to my labor law colleague Bill Corbett for suggesting the case. The a r gument, on the Oyez

Project October Term, 2001, is a spectacular specimen of legal analysis that brings Court and
,

counsel to class.

Justice Scalia, Mt. Etna, erupts in opposition to the Government's argument

regarding the Labor Boa rd s award of back pay to illegal aliens for an employer's violation of the
'

labor act.

I have listened to the entire argument.

It proves the potency of the tapes beyond

constitutional law. The sound effects are reminiscent of HART & SACHS legal process materials.

My colleague Ed Richards, who teaches administrative and public health law, became an instant
convert to the tapes method, at my cajoling, after listening to the dialectic of Court and counsel in
a favorite case of his teaching, FDA

v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).

Whether the Food and Drug Administration has jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products on the
theory that nicotine is a "drug" within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, is the
q u estion presented, hotly contested by Solicitor General Seth Waxman, in support of regulatory
authority, to the utter disbelief of Chief Justice R ehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice O'Connor
during oral argument. The Court splits itself open at the seam, 5 to 4, against FDA jurisdiction
("Congress has directly spoken to the issue here and precluded the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products"); Justice Breyer, hearing different "music" in the statutory framework, 529 U.S.
at 189, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissents ("this particular drug [nicotine]
and device (a cigarette] risks the life-threate ning ha rms that administrative regu lation seeks to
The majority's conclusion is counter intuitive").

rectify.

Ed Richards adds, "[t]he argument is

interesting because Scalia and the conservative judges who prevail are pushing for the use of
history of tobacco regulation to change the plain meaning of the statute, while Breyer is arguing to
read the words and ignore the history." Professor Richards has downloaded the Oyez Project

audio in FDA

v.

Brown & Williamson and posted it on his Medical and Public Health Law Site at

LSU Law Center, which is permissible with attribution to the Oyez Project.

Take note, ye

Bloggers.

35. My friend Yale Kamisar loudly objected ("Why tapes, why not transcripts?") to my

Phoenix Arizona, sound machine demonstration of the tapes method at a joint program of the
,

Sections on Constitutional Law and Teaching Methods, 1980 annual meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools. See supra note

*.
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A. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL POWER
36

1. BAKER V. CARR, OCTOBER TERM, 1960.

"Arguing a case before the Supreme Court of the United States isn't
37
making mud pies," said Justice Frankfurter, who comes to class in Baker
v.

Carr to excoriate Archibald Cox for seeking a judicial dismantling under

the Equal Protection Clause of Tennessee's malapportioned legislature.
Frankfurter wonders out loud about the reach of judicial power. His is the
Voice of Judicial Restraint. On the flip side, Solicitor General Cox holds
up pretty well against Frankfurter, urging a competing philosophy of
judicial action in the face of irrational discrimination affecting voting
38
rights.
Talk about fireworks that enliven our learning! Things get started
with Justice Potter Stewart reminding Solicitor General Cox that the Court
had sustained a complete denial of voting rights for women. Why worry
about geographical vote dilution?

More bluntly, Justice Frankfurter

galvanic voice of the past-insists that the Court stay entirely out of this
"political thicket." Listen for yourself:
SOLICITOR GENERAL ARCHIBALD Cox:

It seems to me that a

geographicalJUSTICE STEW ART: Of course, it could be done with respect to all

women, couldn't it?
MR. Cox: So far as the Fourteenth-

36. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). We owe to Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago, and a former law clerk to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and to Gerhard Casper,
Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Chicago, the enduring collection of
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (384 vols. through 2008).

This monumental series of black ink in red

binding puts into our pedagogical hands the intellectual capital of full briefs and transcripts of oral
argument in all constitutional landmarks, including those replayed herein. To read the transcript
of the oral reargument in Baker, excerpted in Part Ill.A. I., see Transcript of Oral Argument, Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in 56 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE U NITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL L AW 615 (Philip B. Kurland

& Gerhard

Casper eds., Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1975). To listen to the oral reargument in Baker, excerpted in
Part

III.Al.,

see

Recording

of Oral

Argument,

Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S.

186

(1962),

http://oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960 6.
_

37. HARLAN B. PHILL IPS, FELIX F RANKFURTER REMINISCES 268 (Reyna!

& Co. 1960).

38. "Next to the Supreme Court itself perhaps the most important factor in the sequence of
reapportionment litigation, viewed as a 'refonn caucus in action,' was the Solicitor General of the
United States, Archibald Cox . .

.

."ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESE NTATION:

REAPPORTIONMENT TN LAw AND POLITICS 201 (Oxford univ. Press 1968).

His clev�m�ss in shaping lit igati on tactics to match apparent judicial predilections (an aspect
of constitutional law development on which too little research has been done) suggests that
the creative aspects of the decision making process in the Supreme Court are only half
revealed when attention is confined to judicial votes and written opinions.
Id.
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It

required an additional amendment to the Constitution to give females
the vote, did it not?

MR. Cox: I suppose the question would be raised whether that was an
arbitrary discrimination.
[Laughter.]
JUSTICE STEWART: It was raised. It was raised.

MR. Cox: I had forgotten the case.
JUSTICE STEW ART: And it was decided in this Court.

MR. Cox: That it was not an arbitrary discrimination.
JUSTICE STEWART: That all women could be denied the vote under

the Fourteenth Amendment, and under the Constitution generally, until
we got the suffrage Amendment.
At this point i n class, I pause t h e recording with m y mouse and
39
rehearse Minor v. Happersett for the benefit of my students, dehors the
recording.

The tapes, say it softly, teach the importance of knowing your

case law.

MR. Cox: But it seems to me that the fact that a rational line can be
drawn between men and women does not g o to indicate that a rational
line can be drawn in terms of race or in terms of geography. SurelyJUSTICE STEWART: A rational line can certainly be drawn between the

sexes in many areas, but-

MR. Cox: And i n voting.
JUSTICE STEWART: It was.

MR. Cox: Well, in terms of the whole legal background it seems to m e
that I would n o t quarrel with the decision o f the Court. Surely, nothing
in the decision-and I think this is the only important point-surely
nothing in the decision indicates that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not prohibit irrational differentiation with respect of the exercise of the
right to vote.

3 9. 8 8 U.S.

And a geographical discrimination, I think it must b e

(2 1 Wall.) 1 62 ( 1 874) (on writ of error to the Supreme Court of Missouri).

Minor was a Missouri lady and a citizen of the United States.

Mrs.

The Supreme Court rejected her

claim that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred the right of suffrage upon her. Said Chief Justice
Morrison

R. Waite: "Being unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States

does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitution and laws of the
several States which commit !hat important trust to men alone

AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT." Id. at 1 7 8 .

are

not necessarily void, we
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agreed, can b e as arbitrary and discriminatory as many others. Nobody
would debate the case if a State were to say that the voters in the
eastern half shall have ten votes, and the voters in the western half
shall each have one, or one vote and one-tenth of a vote.
process

of

apportioning

representatives

the

State

If by the
gives

ten

representatives to each of the sparsely settled counties in the eastern
half and only one to each of the well settled counties in the western
half, that seems to me just as arbitrary and just as capricious as
labeling the fraction of the vote that those under-represented are
entitled to get.

Certainly there is no merit in the argument that the

appellees make, that the Constitution guarantees only the right to cast a
ballot and to have it physically counted, but it doesn 't guarantee you
anything with respect to the value o f the count that it gets, and it may
be neglected from then on.
And now Mr. Justice Frankfurter pipes in:
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Mr. Solicitor, may I put this to you: You
belong to an administration which has had signal experience with the
inability of two houses of the legislature to agree on highly desirable
legislation.

And it may well be that Tennessee may have had

difficulties from year to year in getting the two houses to agree to a
proper apportionment. Now, I take it mandamus couldn't lie, so that
the constitutional right derives from the fact that two houses of the
Legislature can ' t agree on what is proper legislation. I didn 't mean to
say anything except to call attention to a well-known legislative fact,
of which the last session of Congress was a signal demonstration, the
difficulty of getting concord between two houses of a legislature on
legislation deemed highly desirable.
Frankfurter prided himself on his p o litical, as well as his legal,
acumen.

We j oin him in the cloakroom.

Soli citor General Cox, on the

other hand, has a competing view of the situation.

He tells our c lassroom

apprentices:
MR. Cox: I cannot speak with any great knowledge about the p o litical
history of Tennessee.

My reading of the allegations in the complaint

would indicate that the difficulty wasn' t in getting the two houses to
agree. It was simply that the minority who have this unjustified, as we
say, power, won' t give it up.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: But we know that legislation doesn' t merely
mean-the process of legislation-isn't merely what gets on the floor
of legislatures .

We know that the legislative process is agreement in

what has, in reference to the Hill, been called the "cloakroom."

We

know that the process involves agreement or disagreement between
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those who wield political power. And it may well-looking ahead, as
I for one have to look ahead-it may well be that this is one of these

situations. And, therefore, it isn't really-we're not really engaged in
an abstract question: Is there jurisdiction, abstractly considered, but
what can you do about it? Not "you"; meaning, what can a court do
about it?

Or what is involved?

I take it you agree you couldn't

mandamus them to apportion, could you?
MR. Cox: Well, I had hoped to postpone until later the suggestion of

what the decree might be. I was going to suggest that there were a
number of possibilities.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: You couldn 't mandamus the legislature,

could you?
MR. Cox: No, you could not.

Why not?
Marbury

v.

What about Chief Justice Marshall's admonition in

Madison : "The very essence o f civil liberty certainly consists in

the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
4°
Chief Justice Marshall reminds u s , "In Great Britain the king
protection."
himself is sued in the respectful form of a
comply with the judgment of his court."

.rietition,
1

and he never fails to

Why not mandamus the

Tennessee Legislature to do its constitutional duty?
You can see how the tapes method stirs up thought in the classroom.
Teacher and student become a part of the S ocratic dialogue of Court and
counsel. Thereafter, it' s back to Oyez Proj ect:
JUSTICE WHITTAKER: Well, even if you couldn't tell them what to

do, does that mean that there isn't power to tell them that what they are
doing is unlawful?
MR. Cox: It does not; and frequently telling them what they are doing

is unlawful supplies the necessary impetus to achieve a solution of the
matter.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: And you think, if you can't go beyond that,

that that is a fair legal argument to make, that you might push them
into doing something which legally you couldn't compel them to do?
You think that's a fair argument?
MR. Cox: I think that is a factor to be taken into-

40. Marbury v.
41. Id.

Madison,

5 U.S. (l Cranch) 1 37, 163 (1803).
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JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: You think that's a fair argument to address

to this Court, that you might push them into doing things, although
legally you couldn't make them?
"Why tapes, why not transcripts?", Yale Kamisar boomed when he
heard me playing select Supreme Court tapes at a joint program of the

Sections on Constitutional Law and Teaching Methods at the 1 980 annual
42

meeting of the Association of American Law S chools, Phoenix, Arizona.

This was my first formal tapes demonstration, trumpeting "The Supreme
43
My g oal was to
Court Tapes: Lively Conversations for the Classroom."
attract a large crow d and let the tapes do the talking. I expected opposition
from the Old Guard.

There is nothing about playing tapes in Edward H.

("Bull") Warren' s Spa rtan Education, a book that aims "to g iv e some
helpful suggestions to younger men who e arnestly seek to justify their
44
existence by becoming effective teachers of the law."
The

answer,

Yale,

to

your

que stion,

"Why

tapes,

not

why

transcripts?", is heard when you listen to Frankfurter's high pitch at this
precise point in the oral argument, almost a scream, at Cox as the judicial
curtain closed in on Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Baker

v.

Ca r r .

"[W]ords,

especially the written words, of another canno t convey the reality of Felix
Frankfurter. There is no substitute for the apprehension of the senses. One
45
needs to see, to hear . . . . " His dissent, which refers b ack to Cox ' s
argument, was h i s last judicial breath:
We were soothingly told at the bar of this Court that we need not
worry about the kind of remedy a court could effectively fashion once
the abstract constitutional right to have courts pass on a state-wide
system of electoral districting is recognized as a matter of judicial
rhetoric, because legislatures would heed the Court's admonition. This
is not only a euphoric hope. It implies

a

sorry confession of judicial

impotence in place of a frank acknowledgment that there is not under
our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief, for
every undesirable exercise of legislative power. The Framers carefully
46
and with deliberate forethought refused so to enthrone the judiciary.
For Frankfurter, the Warren C ourt' s opinion in Baker

v.

Ca r r ,

authored b y Frankfurter ' s student at Harvard Law School, William J .
42. Ass'n of Am. Law Sch. 1 980 Annual Meeting Program, Sections on Constitutio
nal Law
and Teaching Methods, supra note *, at 19.
43. Id.

44. EDWARD H.

WARREN, SPARTAN EDUCATION ix (Houghton, Mifflin 1 942).
45. Dean G. Acheson, Felix Frankfurter, 76 HARV. L. REV. 14, 14 ( 1 962) (emphasis
added).
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 86, 269-70 ( 1 962) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting
, with Harlan, J.
joining).
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Brennan, Jr., is anathema-"sounding a word o f promise to the ear, sure to
47
The Warren Court, history teaches us, left

be disappointing to the hope."

Frankfurter behind, its word of promise fulfilled. What is important here is
that the sounds of these competing faiths endure "for untold generations."
This is how Justice Frankfurter inscribed a p h otograph I have hanging on
the wall of my office, next to an inscribed p hotograph of Justice Brennan.
Frankfurter's inscription reads: "Every good wish to Louisiana State
University Law School for untold generations from Felix Frankfurter,
48
December 1 6, 1 952." This was "The Year of the Steel Case," Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co.

v.

Sawyer. 49 I found this photograph in a box stored in

the basement of the LSU law library gathering dust. It has b een on my
5°
office wall ever since.
Frankfurter' s faith i s a part of m( teaching.
5
Indeed, the Oyez Proj ect sounds his voice of udicial restraint, along side
5
Justice Brennan' s voice of judicial action.
We sense the tug of war

}

between these competing voices of the past, Term after Term, Court after
Court, Chief Justice after Chief Justice.

Christopher Columbus Langdell's

casebook has come alive. OYEZ, OYEZ, OYEZ:
MR. Cox: I think in determining-first, I have not suggested that there
is no other relief that the Court could frame.

I think that in

47. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 8 6, 269-70 ( 1 962) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting, with Harlan, J.
joining).
48. Paul A. Freund, Foreword: The Year ofthe Steel Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 89 ( 1 952).
49. 343 U.S. 579 ( 1 952).
5 0. Compare Frankfurter's own teaching: "One of my hobbies in those enviable Cambridge
days was to have the picture of the Supreme Court justices around when we talked about the
opinions written by those judges." Felix Frankfurter to Edward H. Warren, May 6, 1 9 4 1 (on file
in Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1 1 0); see also Baier, supra note 4, at 620 n.7
(quoting same).

Contemporary Harvard Law School Professor Lani Guinier laments that when

she mentions Supreme Court Justices by name in class, "my students give me blank stares. They
do not have in their mind's eye an image of the Justices.

They don't know what each Justice

looks or sounds like . . . . " Guinier, supra note 14, at 25 n. l 04. It might help, she suggests, if her
students "could hear the Justices speak.

This would help them to recognize the style of each

Justice and would humanize authority that is so often v irtually anonymous."

Id.

The Oyez

Project fills Professor Guinier' s void, if I may speak for our friend Jerry Goldman, Mr. Oyez Man
himself.

In my own teaching I follow Harvard Law School Professor Felix Frankfurter's

precedent of having the picture of the Supreme Court justices around when we talk about the
opinions written by those judges.

And my students hear the voices of the Justices off the Oyez

Project. Requiescat in pace Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
5 1 . When Justice Frankfurter died after his final judicial utterance, his dissent i n Baker

Carr,

v.

a former law clerk and Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History at the Yale

Law School, Alexander Bickel said of him: "His voice will be heard, and he will influence
political thought so long as there is a Supreme Court and so Jong as men are concerned to make
their actions fit the American constitutional tradition."
1882-1965, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 6, 1965, at 7 .

Alexander Bickel, Felix Franlfurter,

52. You hear Justice Brennan's competing voice o f judicial action in favor of constitutional
rights during the oral argument in Griswold v. Connecticut, discussed infra, at Part III . C . 3 .
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determining how to exercise its discretion, one of the factors that this
Court may take into account-and I think it frequently has taken into
account-is the very great likelihood that public officials and others in
this country will comply with the law where it is clearly declared.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: I know of only one such case, Mr. Solicitor,

just one such case-and it's a case that ought to give a court pause
and that is a suit brought by Virginia against West Virginia, which this
Court dawdled over nearly twenty years because of the difficulties of
seeing the end of the road in case West Virginia thumbed its nose at
the Court and you couldn't seize the statehouse. There' s jus t one such
case in the whole history. I venture to believe you couldn' t contradict
that statement.
MR. Cox: M r Justice, there 've been other cases, I think, where, if the
.

Court had really had to resort to its physical power, it's very doubtful
whether the decree would ever have been made effective. There was
the decree, of course, of which John Marshall said-of which Andrew
Jackson said, "John Marshall has made h i s decree; now let him enforce
it."

There have been cases-there is a case, if my memory is right,

where the CourtJUSTICE FRANKFURTER: A l l you 're suggesting is a case where the

President of the United States was disobedient, apart from the fact that
it's very dubious whether Jackson ever said that.

Nobody has been

able to trace the accuracy of that statement.
[Laughter.]
Laughte r breaks tension, and so we take our leave of Frankfurter, Cox,

and the Oyez Proj ect i n class. I tell my Louisiana students, proudly, that it
fell to Louisiana's Great Chief Justice Edward Douglass White to close the
book on the long drawn out fight between Virginia and West Virginia that
Mr. Justice Frankfurter had in mind, in which one of two sister states sought
to disregard without judicial sanction its obligation under the United States
Constitution. Chief Justice Edward Douglass White would have none of it.
He withheld mandamus, for the moment, believing that "we may be spared
in the future the necessity of exerting compulsory power against one of the
States of the Union to compel it to discharge a plain duty resting upon it
53
Professor Thomas Reed Powell, of the Harvard
under the Constitution. "
Law School, praised White' s handling of

Virginia v. West Virginia

by

p a y ing tribute "to the statesmanship that accords to the defendant the

respect which refuses to believe that this action will continue, now that the

53. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 604 (1918).
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question of duty is authoritatively and finally determined."
temperate view prevailed.

54

White's

A year later an acknowledgment

o f the

satisfaction of the Court ' s decree was fil e d by counsel for the contending
55
All of which adds a level of learning a step above Frankfurter and

States.

Cox, which is our goal.
Archibald C o x was my teacher at Harvard Law School.

The tapes

bring back fond memories of his craggy Maine voice, his granite integrity,
56
More importantly, he j oins m e in class as a model of what it

his bow tie.

means to think like a lawyer. Archibald Cox, aside Felix Frankfurter, lives
on for untold generations by virtue of the Oyez Project, a veritable Edison
Phonograph of the Supreme Court of the United States.
oral history of the C ourt and its voices.

It is an amazing

"The use of oral evidence," Paul

Thompson tells us, "breaks through the barriers between the chroniclers and
57
their audience; between the educational institution and the outside world. "
The Supreme Court tapes add to constitutional law what oral evidence adds
to history:
Finally, oral evidence can achieve something more pervasive, and
more fundamental to history.

While historians study the actors of

history from a distance, their characterizations of their lives, views,
and actions will always risk being misdescriptions, projections of the
historian's own experience and imagination: a scholarly form of
fiction. Oral evidence, by transforming the ' obj ects' of the study into
'subjects, ' makes for a history which is not just richer, more vivid and
heartrending, but

truer. 58

54. Thomas Reed Powell, Coercing a State to Pay a Judgment: Virginia
1 , 3 2 ( 1 9 1 8).

MICH. L. REV.

v.

West Virginia, 1 7

55. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS
FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 1 29 (Columbia Univ. Press
1 928).

56. After thirty years of teaching constitutional law at LSU Law Center, I sent a note of thanks
to Professor Cox, who was retired and living in Maine. He was in his nineties. He was of the Old
School. His teaching meant much to me. His hand-written reply, all the way from Condon Point
Road in Brooksville, Maine, is a treasure: "I greatly appreciated your kind words for my teaching.
You have probably been teaching long enough now to know that the greatest satisfaction comes to
a professor from a former student's saying that one 's teaching contributed." Letter from
Archibald Cox to author (Oct. 26, 2000), in Paul R. Baier, On Being Knighted by the Louisiana
Bar Foundation: Distinguished Professor 2004, 65 LA. L. REV. 1 1 59, 1 1 64 (2005) .

57. PAUL R. THOMPSON, THE VOICE OF THE PA ST : ORAL HISTORY 7-8 (Oxford Univ. Press
1978) (2d ed. 1 988; 3 d ed. 2000). Paul Thompson is Professor of Social History at the University
of Essex, Founder of the National Life Story Collection at the British Library National Sound
Archive and founder-editor of Oral History.
58. Id. at 90. John Henry Wigmore quotes Benedetto Croce to the same effect: "All histories
separated from their living documents are empty narratives. And, since they are empty, they fall
short of truth . . . . " JOHN HENRY WIG MORE PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL HI S TORI ES 12
,
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B. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, SEPARA TION OF POWERS
2. UNITED STA TES

V.

NIXON, OCTOBE R TERM, 1 973.

59

Constitutio nal law has matured considerab ly since President Jackson
supposedly thumbed his nose at Chief Justice Marshall. After more than

two centuries, the doctrine of judicial supremacy is pretty well established ,
from Marbury v. Madison, through United States v. Nixon, right up to
60
Charles Lee, E s q . , late
October Term, 2007.
Boumediene v. Bush,
Attorney General of the United States, argued the cause for Wil liam
Marbury, but this was at the February Term, 1 803 .

There was no Edison

Phonograph at the time. Thanks to W i l liam Cranch 's report, however, you
get a pretty good idea of what it was like. Lee told Chief Justice John
Marshall

&

Co.,

"I

declare

it to

be

my

opinion,

grounded

on

a

comprehensive view of the subject, that the President is not amenable to
any court of j u dicature for the exerci s e of his high functions, but is
61
Mandamus
responsible only in the mode pointed out in the constitution."
to

Secretary of State James Madison was another matter altogether,
62
according to Lee.
I t ' s too bad the Oyez Proj ect does not go back that far.

(West 1928).
59. United States v. Nixon, 4 1 8 U.S. 683 ( 1 974). To read the transcript of the oral argument
in Nixon, excerpted in Part Ill.B.2., see Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Nixon, 4 1 8
U . S . 683 ( 1 974), in 7 9 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS O F THE SUPREME COURT O F THE
U N ITFD STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., Univ.
Publ'ns of Am. l 975). To listen to the oral argument in Nixon, excerpted in Part III.B .2, see
Recording of Oral Argument, United States v. Nixon, 4 1 8 U . S . 683 ( 1 974),
http://oyez.org/cases/ 1 970- l 979/ l 974/l 974_ 73_1 766.
60. 1 28 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
6 1 . Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 1 37 , 149 ( 1 803) (argument of Charles Lee, Esq.).
In the early days of the Supreme Court, and continuing up to the late 1 940s, Reporters such as
William Cranch, John Marshall ' s reporter, included in their reports the oral arguments of counsel
as they took them down in open court.
All is changed, and not for the better. We no longer see the reporter sitting in court, noting
the oral argument and colloquies between judge and counsel, which in the older reports, and
in those of England sometimes even now, are so instructive and enable the reader to
understand much that he might otherwise overlook.
Heruy Budd, Reports and Some Reporters, 47 AM. L. REV. 48 1 , 5 14 ( 1 9 1 3) , quoted in PAUL R.

BAIER, COURT REPORTS AND REPORTERS OF DECISIONS: FROM EDMUNDUS PLOWDEN TO HENRY
PUTZEL, JR., WITH HEADNOTES BIOGRAPHICAL & LEGAL AND A SYLLA B U S 20 l n. l (New

Orleans, Ass'n of Reporters of Jud. Decisions 1 990). My friend Frank Wagner, Esq. , incumbent
Reporter of Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, infom1s me that the papers of
the Reporter's Office do not indicate exactly when the arguments of counsel were dropped from
the United States Reports, but they were gone by the late 1 940s. Ex rel. Frank Wagner, Dec. 23,
2008. See also Frank Wagner, The Role of the Supreme Court Reporter in Historv, 26 J. OF SUP.
CT. HISTORY 9 (200 I ).
62. Mr. Lee observed that the Secretary of State' s duties are of two kinds, and he exercises his
functions in two different capacities. As a public ministerial officer of the United States, his duty
is to the United States or its citizens. As agent of the President, his duty is to the President. "ln
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"[N]o teaching i s good," said James Bradley Thayer, "which does not

�

ro�se and 'dep h legmatize' the s dents . . . which does not en& age as its
.
alhes, their awakened, s ympathetic, and cooperating faculties."
Nothing
rouses students more than hearing first-rate l awyers arguing real cases,
especially those of enduring significance.

The tapes method puts our

students in the shoes o f real lawyers and real j udges in actual cases .
This brings u s t o our second cut: Leon Jaworski and James S t . Clair
squaring off in the Nixon

Tapes Case. 64

During class discussion, I play

select excerpts of the oral arguments of Leon Jaworski, James St. Clair, and
Philip Lacovara.

Our c lassroom is "interactive," to borrow the jargon of

learning theorists.

Yearbooks

I have read my share in this field, just as Holmes read

in h i s day. "What, Fessenden, do you think Jaworski will say to

Justice Stewart' s

question?"

After Fessenden responds

immediately test his answer against Jaworski ' s .

c l ass, we

Sometimes a student is

quite pleased with herself, which is a good thing.
important to learning.

in

Reinforcement is

S ometimes a sup p l e mental lecture is in order, or I

will ask a few questions myself: "What, Myers, does Mr. St. C lair mean
when he tells Justice Marshall, ' This i s being submitted to this Court for its
guidance and judgment with respect to the law. The President, on the other
hand, has his obligations under the Constitution. "' Then we listen to more
argument and this, in tum, prompts more questions.

Every student is

the former capacity he is compellable by mandamus to do his duty; in the latter he is not."
Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (I Cranch) 13 7, 1 39 ( 1 803) (argument of Charles Lee, Esq.).

Reporter William Cranc h ' s marginal note says: "A mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a
secretary of state to deliver a commission to which the party is entitled." Id.

63. JAME S BRADLEY THAYER , CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, WITH NOTES vii (Riverside

Press

1 895). Thayer' s casebook was the first in its field, in two volumes, published in l 895.

He

was a contemporary of Christopher Columbus Langdell, progenitor of the "case method" of
studying law at the Harvard Law School, which was all the marvel, and mystery, in its day. In his

teaching, Thayer "aimed to bring out the precise legal significance of each case he dealt with. The
exact question of law decided by the court was the fundamental thing to be considered . . . . He
never found more in a case than actually was there, and nothing that was there escaped him."
JAMES PARKER HALL, James Bradley Thayer, in THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD

LAW SCHOO L

64.

1 8 1 7- 1 9 1 7, 276, 2 8 1 (Harv. Law Sch. Ass ' n 1 9 1 8).

In my teaching, I use excerpts from a reel-to-reel copy of the National Archives Sound

Recording Division ' s audio recording of the Nixon Tapes Case. I discovered this sound recording
at the Archives on a junket of my own while working inside the Supreme Court as a Judicial
Fellow,

1 975-76.

fingertips.

This was long before the Oyez Project put the Supreme Court tapes at our

Strangely, when I searched for United States

v.

Nixon, October Term,

1 973, on the

Oyez Project's website, it was not listed. A quick wire to our friend Jerry Goldman brought an
almost instantaneous reply: "But it is classified in the

1 974 Term. It should be 1973 Term.

make this change in the new Oyez (soon to be released to the world).

I will

We have stopped

development on the current (old) Oyez site. Yours obediently, jg." E-mail from Jerry Goldman to
author (Dec.
granted, sire.

1 8, 2008, 1 4:38 CST) (on file with author) (reprinted with permission). "Permission
Let him who is perfect cast the first bit or byte.

Goldman to author (Dec.

Whatever."

1 8, 2008, 1 5 :53 CST) (on file with author).

E-mail from Jerry
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l istening.

Everyone is involved.

How c ou l d i t be otherwise?

This i s the

real thing. Hear it for yourself:
MR. JAWORSKI: Now may I, before I get to the jurisdictional points,
briefly state what we consider to be a bird ' s eye view of this case.
Now enmeshed in almost 500 pages of briefs, when boiled down, this
case really presents one fundamental issue: Who it to be the arbiter of
what the Constitution says?

Basically, this is not a novel question

although the factual situation involved is, of course, unprecedented.

I should hope Marbury

v.

Madison comes to my student ' s mind at this

point.
MR. JAWORSKI: Now, the President may b e right in how he reads the
Constitution. But he may also be wrong. And if he is wrong, who is
there to tell him so?

And if there is no one, then the President, of

course, is free to pursue his course of erroneous interpretations. What
then becomes of our constitutional form of government?

So when

counsel for the President in his brief states that thi s case goes to the
heart of our basic constitutional system, we agree.

Because in our

view, this nation' s constitutional form of government is in serious
jeopardy if the President, any President, is to say that the Constitution
means what he says it means, and that there is no one, not even the
Supreme Court, to tell him otherwise.
Fortunately, Mr. Justice Stewart, from my home town of C in cinnati,
Ohio, now joins us in c lass-from the

Supreme Bench in Washington,

D . C., to Room 106, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
This i s another feature of the Oyez Proj ect: instantaneous time and space
travel:
JUSTICE STEWART: Mr. Jaworski, the President went to a court. He
went to the district court with his motion to quash, and then filed a
cross-petition here. He's asking the Court to say that his position is
correct as a matter of law, is he not?
MR. JAWORSKI: He is saying his position is correct because he
interprets the Constitution that way.
JUSTICE STEW ART: Correct.

He is submitting his position to the

Court and asking us to agree with it. He went to the district court, and
he has petitioned in this Court. He has himself invoked the judicial
process, and he has submitted to it.
MR. JA WORKSKI : Well , that is not entirely correct, Mr.Justice.
JUSTICE STEWART: Didn't he file a motion to quash the subpoenas in
the District Court of the United States?
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MR. JAWORSKI: Sir, he has also taken the position that we have no

standing in this Court to have this issue heard.
Sure enough, Pre s ident Nixon' s brief, available m the Landmark
Briefs and Arguments collection,65 p lainly s ays in its argumentative
headings:

II. The court lacks jurisdiction over an internal dispute of a co-equal
branch;

III.

A presidential assertion of priv ilege is not reviewable by the

Court;

A. The separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial review o f
the use of executive privilege b y a President.
Back to Court:
JUSTICE STEWART: As a matter of law-he is making that argument

to a court; that as a matter of constitutional law he is correct.
MR. JAWORSKI: So that of course this Court could then not pass upon

the constitutional question of how i nterprets the Constitution, i f his
position were correct. But IJUSTICE STEWART: As a matter of law, h i s position is that he i s the

sole judge, and he is asking this court to agree with that propositi on, as
a matter of constitutional law.
MR. JAWORSKI : But what I am saying is that if he is the sole judge,

and if he is to be considered the sole judge, and he is in error in his
interpretation, then h e goes on being in error i n his interpretation.
JUSTICE STEWART: Then this Court will tell him so. That is what this

case is about, isn't it?
MR. JAWORSKI: Well, that is what I think the case is about, yes, sir.

Enter the Chief Justice of the United State s :
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: He is submitting himself to the judicial

65. 79 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 463 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., Univ. Publ'ns of

Am. 1 975). The Landmark Briefs and Arguments series i s another vital tool o f constitutional law
pedagogy.

1 do not mean to suggest that I eschew black ink entirely. A s I said a quarter of a

century ago: "Now, plainly, only a fool would urge burning casebooks and ravaging law review
articles." Baier, supra note 4, at 634. My students inspect real briefs and come at the cases "from

in front," to

use Karl Llewellyn's telling figure.

"We make slight effort to get hold of counsel 's

argument, and so to present the case as an exercise in how a lawyer goes about his job, an exercise
in dealing with cases from in front." Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 793.
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process in the same sense that you are, is that not so, Mr. Jaworski?
MR. JAWORSKI : Well, I can't see thatCHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: You take one position and he takes another.
MR. JAWORSKI: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, in my view, frankly, it is a

position where he says the Constitution says this, "and nobody is going
to tell me what the Constitution says. " Because up to this point, up to
this point, he says that he and he alone is the proper one to interpret the
Constitution.

Now, there is no way to escape that, because the briefs

definitely point that out, time after time.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I think this matter may be one of semantics.

Each of you is taking a different position on the basic question, and
each of you is submitting for a decision to this Court.
MR. JAWORSKI: That may be, sir.
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Well, we start with a Constitution that does not

contain the words "executive privilege" is that right?
MR. JAWORSKI : That is right, sir.
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: So why don't we go on from there?

As President Nixon's brief shows, the matter goes beyond semantics.
Chief Justice Burger is wrong. The President is claiming that separation of
powers

precludes

j udicial review of his i nvocation of executive privilege.

The Executive Branch is the sole judge of its own prerogatives, j ust as the
Surely, this is

Court and the Congress are independent of the Executive.
more than semantics.

It is separation of powers writ large with President

Nixon holding the writ. The Court's S o cratic questioning prompts our own
in class: "Is Chief Justice Burger right to

say the matter i s

one of

semantics?"
The Oyez Project is thus a good source of exam questions.

This is a

practical consideration not to be overlooked. Justice Douglas' s observation
that the Constitution does not contain the words "executive privilege"
surely challenges us to go beyond text.

The Supreme Court tapes are a

treasure trove of interpretative techniques, of application of prec edent, of

stare decisis,

of words and meaning--constitutional hermeneutic s caught

on magnetic tape.
Hart & Sachs ' s
Project.

John Chipman Gray ' s

The Legal Process

It teaches by example .

words "judicial supremacy."

The Nature and Sources of Law,

are at your fingertips

on

the Oyez

The Constitution does not contain the

Nor are the words "judicial review" found

therein. So we go on from there in class.
As for "the

right of privacy,"

it

too

nowhere

appears

in

the
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Justice Douglas himself goes beyond text-to

"penumbras" and "emanations"-and gives voice to the right of privacy in
66
the Court's opinion in Griswold v. Con necticut.
This, over vocal
objections from Justice Hugo L. Black, whom you will hear later in our
tapes demonstration.
But first, let us hear Justice Thurgood Marshall questioning President
Nixon's lawyer James St. Clair, Esq., on the subject of judicial supremacy.
Whether President Nixon would abide the Supreme Court's j udgment and
tum over the tapes if ordered to do so was c learly on the Court' s mind, as
well as the Nation ' s, when the Nixon Tapes Case was argued in the summer
of 1 974. The c ourtroom was packed.

history being made. "67

Everyone wanted "tickets to watch

MR. ST. CLAIR: Well, if Your Honor please, we are submitting the

matterJUSTICE MARSHALL : You are submitting the matter to this Court
MR. ST. CLAIR: To this Court under a special showing on behalf of

the PresidentJUSTICE MARSHALL: And you are still leaving it up to this Court to

decide it.
MR. ST. CLAIR: Well, yes, in a sense.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, in what sense?
MR. ST. CLAIR: In the sense that this Court has the obligation to

determine the law-alright.

The President also has an obligation to

carry out his constitutional duties.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: You are submitting it for us to decide whether

or not executive privilege is available in this case
MR. ST. CLAIR: The question is probably even more limited than that.

Is the executive privilege, which my Brother concedes, absolute, or is
it only conditional?
JUSTICE MARSHALL: I said, "in this case."

Can you make it any

narrower than that?
MR. ST. CLAIR: No, sir.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, do you agree that that is what is before

66. Griswold

v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

67. Sally Quinn, What Being "In " Yesterday Was, Was Being in at All,
1 974, at Bl.

WASH. POST, July 9,
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this Court, and you are submitting it to this Court for decision?
MR. ST. CLAIR: This is being submitted to this Court for its guidance

and judgment with respect to the law.

The President, on the other

hand, has his obligations under the Constitution.
JUSTICE MARSHALL: Are you submitting it to this Court for this

Court' s decision?
MR. ST. CLAIR: As to what the law is, yes.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: If that were not so, you would not be here.
MR. ST. CLAIR: I would not be here.

Justice Marshall' s vivisection of Mr. St. Clair is a classroom exemplar
of what my new friend and Loyola, New Orleans, Colle �e of Law Professor

Stephen Higginson calls "constitutional reductionism."

8

Justice Marshall

cuts to the heart of the matter in oral argument without worrying about the
niceties of the law.

There is no beating around the bush.

The bird is

flushed out immediately. To really appreciate Thurgood Marshall' s talent,
you have to hear his voice in oral argument, or hear him announcing his
dissent from the bench in Allen B akke ' s case, October Term 1 97 7 , also

available on the Oyez Project. Adding italics to his right cross to St. Clair's
jaw-"I said in this case. Can you make i t any narrower than that?"-is a
poor substitute for Thurgood Marshall ' s v ocal chords in action.

Emotion,

conviction, force, all are missing from the lifeless transcript-Nata bene
Yale Kamisar.
Webster, "The Great Daniel," in argument before the Marshall Court
69
Would that we
always cut to the j ugular . It is a talent to b e emulated.
70
could hear him arguing the Dartmouth College Case.
"It is, Sir, as I have
71
said, a small College. And yet, there a r e those who love it
."
Chief
-

Justice Burger, to his posthumous credit in the Nixon Tapes Case, adds his
own reductionism: "If that were not so, you would not be here."

"I would

not be here."

68. Higginson, Thurgood Marshall, supra note 20, at 74 1 ("Constitutional reductionism is the
reduction of a constitutional argument to a case-determinative point without slipping into
' s implifying darkness '") (quoting Justice Frankfurter).
69. "My style," Daniel Webster said, "was not formed without great care and earnest study of
the best orators.

I have labored hard upon it, for I early felt the importance of expression to

thought." l LEG AL MASTERPIECES 467 (Van Vechten Veeder, ed., Callaghan 1 9 1 2).
70. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U . S . ( 1 Wheat.) 5 1 8 ( 1 8 19).

7 1 . Eulogy on Daniel Webster, in SAMUEL GILMAN BROWN, l THE WORKS OF RUFUS

CHOATE 5 1 6 (Little, Brown

1862). "If a painter could give us the scene on canvas,-those forms

and countenances, and Daniel Webster as he then stood in the midst, it would be one of the most
touching pictures in the history of eloquence." Id. at 5 1 7 .
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James St. Clair taught yours truly Trial Practice at the Harvard Law
School. As to Appellate Practice, you can judge St. Clair's performance off
the Oyez Proj ect for yourself. "I would not be here," he tells my students,
as well as Chief Justice Burger, each Spring in C onstitutional Law I at the
LSU Law Center.

We cover United States

v.

Nixon using the Nixon tapes

in class-not the White House recordings, mind you, or the missing cut of
I mean the dulcet sounds of the Supreme

eighteen and a half minutes.

Court, the Voice of the Past, off the Oyez Project.

To my ear this i s

listening to Stravinsky ' s "Lullaby and Final Hymn" from his "Firebird
72
Ballet Suite," a favorite recording of m y law school days. I would listen
to it on Edison ' s Phonograph, a record p layer, 3 3 1/3 rpm, at the Radcliffe
College library .

This required a brisk walk away from Langdell Hall,
73
gladly taken, up Massachusetts Avenue.
Stravinsky's Firebird, let me
confess here, was m y respite from the Harvard Law School Pressure
Cooker. There was no Oyez Project at the time to give me merry tales and
joyous laughter.
Or do you know the opening of the movie "Amadeus," Salieri' s
envious exclamation while coveting Mozart ' s genius: "MUSIC !" This and
Stravinsky' s "Lullaby and Final Hymn," the Supreme Court tapes bring to
class. Let me repeat my own envious exclamation on hearing Jerry
Goldman's Oyez Proj ect: "MIRACLE! "
Chief Justice Burger has the last word

72. Google "Stravinsky,

m

the Nixon Tapes Case,

Firebird," and hear "Lullaby and Final Hymn" for yourself,

conducted by Igor Stravinsky ( 1 8 82- 197 1 ), New Philharmonia Orchestra, Royal Festival
London, "The Firebird

& Les Noces-Stravinsky" (BBC/Opus Arte 1 965).

media marvel, the ubiquitous "You-Tube."

Hall,

This, on another

I clicked on to this audio-visual recording while

writing this essay on the Supreme Court tapes. I had never experienced "You-Tube" before.
Langdell would have marveled at it. I saw Stravinsky conducting music I heard for the first time
as a student at Harvard Law School.

It was not in Professor Lon Fuller's Contracts casebook.

The sound of the French Hom, when Stravinsky signals it in, is haunting to my memory.

"MUSIC!" It overwhelms you. And Stravinsky leaves the podium, up through the orchestra, and

out the back way, just as Professor Fuller ended his first-year Contracts class, via the back door of
our Langdell Hall classroom.

MEMORY!

73. I owe thanks to my teacher at

Harvard Law School, Professor David Shapiro, for

refreshing my geographical grasp of Cambridge, Massachusetts 's streets after forty years.

I

couldn't remember how I got from Langdell Hall to Ra dcliffe College. Professor Shapiro, via the
miracle of Alexander Graham Bell's telephone, straightened me out and put me on the right path:
"North on Mass. Ave., left on Shepard." Google Earth ' s virtual tour of the route took me back in
time and space. Amazing. And it was good to hear David Shapiro's voice after a generation. I
owe to his labor law seminar my first academic publication following graduation.
Baier, Rights Under a

Collective Bargaining Non-Agreement:

Compensation for a Refusal to Bargain,

47

J. VRB. L. 2 5 3 ( 1 970).

See Paul R.

The Question of Monetary

I owe to Professors Benjamin

Kaplan, Lon Fuller, Robert Keeton, John Dawson, Archibald Cox, Stephen Breyer, and David
Shapiro the desire to become an effective teacher of the law.
crimson example.

I have tried hard because of their
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October Term, 1 973, his announcement of the Opinion of the Court, on July
24, 1974, another gift of the Oyez Project.

�

We hear the fifteenth Ch ef

Justice of the United States utter the words of the fourth, the Great Chief
Justice, John Marshall: "Many decisions of this Court, however, have
unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury against Madison .

.

.

in

1 803, that ' [i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
74
department to say what the law is. ' "
Lifting these words off the printed

page and giving them life emphasizes their i mportance and helps students
appreciate the principle of judicial review and judicial supremacy as thefs

have come down to us through the ages. Thereafter, Boumediene

v.

Bush,

5

October Term 2007, is assigned listening in Constitutional Law I at the
LSU Law Center (Section 2, Mr. Baier).
C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
3. GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, OCTOBER TERM, 1 964.

76

Yale Law School Professor Thomas Emerson confronts both Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Hugo L. Black during the oral argument
in the Connecticut Contraceptive Case, otherwise known as Griswold

v.

Connecticut. I a m sure you have heard of it, but I am equally confident that

most of my listeners here, or readers of Loyola Law Review' s Tug of War
Symposium hereafter, have not heard Professor E merson and Justice Black
waging war with one another over the meaning of liberty and privacy. This
is a favorite sound track of my teaching repertoire.
First, Justice Brennan asks Mr. Emerson about the meaning of the
Connecticut statute at issue. Does it prohibit use of

a

contraceptive device

for the prevention of disease? The ensuing colloquy is an object lesson in
how to read statutes-not a matter to be taken lightly. Of equal importance,
the Supreme Court tapes teach the necessity of anticipating argument from
a variety of doctrinal angles. The tapes, as I said, invite our students into
the Supreme Court's litigation clinic, a pretty good place to exercise the
legal mind and nurture professional skills , the latter of which is all the rave
o f late.

Justice Byron White, as I knew him from life, took h i s exercise

74. United States

v.

Nixon, 4 1 8 U.S. 683, 703 ( 1 974) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1

Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
75. 1 28 S . Ct. 2229 (2008).
76. Griswold v. C o�ecticut, 3 8 1 U.S. 479 ( 1 965). To read the transcript
of the oral argument
.
Griswold, excerpted m Part III.CJ., see Transcript of Oral Argumen
t, Griswold v. Connecticut,
3 8 1 U.S. 479 (1 965), in 6 1 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUME
NTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF
E UNITED STATES: CONSTI�UTIONAL LAW 405 (Philip B. Kurland
& Gerhard Casper eds.,
Umv. Publ, n� of Am. 1 975). To listen to the oral argument
in Griswold, excerpte d in Part m.C.3 . ,
see Recordmg o f Oral Argument, Griswold v . Connec
ticut, 3 8 1 U.S. 479 ( 1 965)
'
http:/loyez.org/cases/ 1 960- 1 969/1 964/ 1 964 496.
.

m

:rn
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playing basketball i n the gymnasium on the top floor of the Supreme Court
("highest court in the land"). He too j oins us in class in Baton Rouge, just
as you will hear him viva voce at Loyola College of Law, New Orleans, via
77
the Pine Street Sound Machine, 0. W. Wollensak, Producer.
There is nothing in Justice Douglas ' s opinion for the C ourt in
Griswold v. Connecticut about equal protection, but Justice Brennan raises
that angle in our classroom. The Oyez Proj ect, nota bene, takes us b eneath
the black ink

of the

Court's

opinions,

exposing the tap

roots

of

constitutional understanding.
MR. EMERSON: The major interpretation of the Connecticut statute i s

not in dispute, either.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: Professor, I'm sorry, I gather, looking at your

brief at page nine, that this exclusion of sales for the prevention of
disease is read into the fact that the statute deals only with use for the
prevention of conception; is that it?
MR. EMERSON: Yes. In additionJUSTICE BRENNAN: I mean, has there been any court decision on
MR. EMERSON: Not in Connecticut, your Honor. The Massachusetts

courts, which have a somewhat similar statute, have interpreted their
statute as not applying to the sale of c ontraceptives for the prevention
of disease; and the Connecticut courts have cited with approval those
Massachusetts decisions, so that we say that, in effect, the Connecticut
courts have taken that position.

But there is no direct ruling by a

Connecticut Court on that point; that' s correct.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, on the strength of that, wouldn 't you have

had a rather compelling equal protection argument, if the Connecticut
courts have gone that far?
MR. EMERSON: Well, you mean thatJUSTICE BRENNAN: I'm just trying to find out why you haven 't made

an equal protection argument which on the face of it, it seems to me
might have considerable merit.
MR. EMERSON: Well, I didn't, I wasn't participating in the case at an

77. "O. W. Wollensak" is my nom de plume, after 0. W. Holmes, Jr., a favorite intellectual
prop, and "Wollensak," the machine on which I played the Supreme Court tapes at the 1 9 80
Phoenix, Arizona, AALS demonstration. See supra note *. In speaking of the equipment I use in

playing the tapes in class, I picked up my trusty Wollensak 2520 (it has since died) and introduced
it to the crowd, saying: "This is my associate, Professor Wollensak, whose circle of constitutional
acquaintances is wide indeed." Id.
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earlier stage, your Honor.

But the

55

equal protection-there are

differences between married and unmarried persons, and between the
use of devices for preventing conception and the use for preventing
disease, and it's conceivable that the State legislature could validly
make distinction between them in some situations.
Let me pause the machine, as I do in class, to interj ect that Professor
Emerson ' s "conception" of "equal protection"-literally and legally, is
quite different from Mr. Justice Brennan ' s .

I t ' s important to their teacher

that my students know the life of Justice Brennan ' s mind. Yale Law School
Professor Thomas Emerson,

sotto voce,

is not in tune with Justice Brennan.

JUSTICE BRENNAN: It just struck me that, if it has merit, i f s a

narrower constitutional ground, it would dispose of the statute, which
is what you want to do.
MR. EMERSON : It would dispose of the statute, your Honor, that's

correct.
JUSTICE WHITE : Professor, Mr. Emerson, are these devices on sale in

drugstores?
MR. EMERSON : There's nothing in the record about that, your Honor.

The question was asked about that at the trial and the evidence was
excluded. I can say, however, from my own information that they are
on sale in the drugstores for the prevention of disease.

They are, at

least technically, not on sale for any other purpose.
Query, was the trial court in error i n excluding evidence of the
availability of condoms in the drugstores?

What about it, class?

I like to

think I am training my student lawyers to try constitutional c as e s , as well as
to argue them in the Supreme Court when it' s their tum.

Although they

doubt it, some do try such cases in court and a few have reached Mt.
78
This i s the joy

Olympus. When they do they call me with the good news.

78. I have in mind my former student E. Wade Shows's telephone call years ago.

He had

reached Mt. Olympus, briefing an equal protection challenge to a Louisiana statute for his chief
Hershel Adcock, Esq., who argued the cause in the Supreme Court of the United States, on
certiorari to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal. Wade tagged along and sat at petitioner's
counsel table. Adcock & Shows won a reversal of one sentence, and one citation.

Chappelle

v.

Greater Baton Rouge Airport Dist., 43 1 U . S . 1 59 ( 1 977). Wade's success gives m e joy, as well as
a neat precedent to teach Churchill's lesson (October 2 9 , 1 94 1 , Harrow School) to my law
students: "[N]ever giv� in, neve� give in, never, never, never, never-in nothing."

Wade's

precedent proves there 1s such a thmg as law. You must fight for it, tirelessly. And then there is
my former student Jelpi Picou' s success this past October Term, 2007, Kennedy

v.

Louisiana, J 2 8

S . Ct. 2641 (2008), a long hard �ighth Amendment struggle, ultimately holding, 5 to

4,

that a

sentence of death for rape of a child under twelve years of age is cruel and unusual punishment.

Rehearing denied, 1 29 S. Ct. 1 (2008). I appeared as counsel of record for amici curiae Louisiana
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of teaching.

"A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his
79
influence stops."
But let ' s get back on Mount Olympus ourselves:
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Openly and avowedly, they're on sale, not

secretively.
Earl Warren' s gravelly voice, his mispronunciation of "secretively," causes
our class to smile. We see condoms oozing out of drugstore counters.
MR. EMERSON:

They're not normally on display, your Honor.

They're under the counter. But there' s no problem of obtaining them
if you ask for them.

Certain devices must be sold on physician's

prescription, of course, and can be obtained only on prescription from
a physician. But others which do not require such a prescription can
be obtained without at the drugstore.
The Supreme Court tapes also teach the vital force of judicial philosophy in
giving shape to our law, especially constitutional law, where the interplay
of black ink and intellectual personality-the human element of our law-is
starkly visible to the eye, and sweetly audible to the ear.

�

guaran

judge ."

0

"[T]here is no

of justice," Cardozo teaches us, "except the personality of the
I know of no better example than Justice Hugo L. B lack's tug of

war with Yale Law School Professor Thomas I. E merson, counsel for
Estelle T. Griswold, in the Connecticut Contraceptive Case. A l l professors
of constitutional law are obliged to teach the case, one way or the other. As
I said, this piece of tape is a favorite composition in the concert hall I
conduct at LSU

law

school.

Teachers

of the Constitution are little

Stravinskys, are we not?

We compose our classes, do we not? Of course,
81
Others favor the
Justice Scali a ' s Firebird is a favorite of many students.
82
Justice
contrapunto of Justice Brennan ' s Contemporary Rati.fication;

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Louisiana Public Defenders Association in
support of petitioner Kennedy.

In other words, teacher and student

ran

the same race, kept the

faith, and won.

79. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 300 (Houghton, Mifflin 1 93 1 ).
80. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 1 6- 1 7 (Yale Univ. Press

1921)

(quoting EUGEN ERHLICH, FREIE RECHTSFINDUNG UNO FREIE RECHTSWISSENCHAFT

(Ernest Bruncken trans., 1 903), reprinted in part in IX SCIENCE OF L EGAL METHOD 47, 65
(Boston Book Co., 1 9 1 7; Rothman Reprints, 1 969) ).

8 1 . No doubt about it. Justice Scalia is

fl Guidice Sapiente as

I have dubbed him.

This, after

teaching with him at Siena, Italy, Summer Term July, 1 99 1 , and in a retrospective of twenty years.

See Paul R. Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian, and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect,

67 LA. L. REV. 469, 502 (2007). And yes, my Scalia musings are assigned reading i n my teaching.
In this, I

am

following Holmes, who told his law clerks that his favorite author was, guess who?

Holmes, J.

8 2. Wil liam J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
Address to the Georgetown University Text

DAVIS L. REV. 2 ( 1 985).

&

Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1 985), in 19

U.C.
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83
October Tenn, 1 985; Justice Breyer's
B lackmun ' s Bowers v. Hardwick,
85
84
or Justice Kennedy ' s Lawrence v. Texas,
Active Liberty;
October Term,
2002.
You can read these pieces of black ink or hear the magnetic tapes for
yourself.

HeinOnline and the Oyez Projec t are at your fingertips at any

Community Coffee House.

Or, if you prefer, at the Napoleon House, 500

Chartres Street, c attycorner from the Louisiana Supreme C o urt, 400 Royal
Street, the heart o f the Vieux Carre.
You hear Hugo B lack himself decrying the doctrine of substantive due
process. This is better than listening to your professor talk about it. I speak
only for myself.

During the oral argument, Justice Black presses Professor

Emerson, counsel for Estelle Griswold, to the limit on his due process
claim.

Emerson' s argument reminds Justice Black of Burns Baking
86
and kindred errors o f the Lochner era. Hugo B lack

Company v. Bryan

would have none o f it:
JUSTICE BLACK: It seems to me what someone has done here
deliberately is to try to force a decision on the broadest possible
meaning of due process, speaking as a matter of substance, and to have
us weigh facts and circumstances as to the advisability of a law like
this rather than leaving it up to the legislature . . . . You pitch it wholly
on due process, with the broad idea that we can look to see how
reasonable or unreasonable the decision of the people of Connecticut
has been in connection with this statute.
MR. EMERSON: We pitch it on due process in the basic sense, yes, that
it arbitrary and unreasonable, and in the special sense that it constitutes
a

deprivation of right against invasion of privacy.

The privacy

argument is a substantially narrower one than the general argument.
JUSTICE BLACK: That's a due process argument?

83. 478 U.S. 1 86, 1 99 ( 1 986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003). Justice B lackmun brought the slip opinion of his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick
to LSU Law Schoo l ' s Summer Program at Aix-en-Provence, France, July 1 986, the year of

Bowers, and he returned to teach at Aix in 1 992, the year of Casey. His teaching, his humility, his
pursuit ofjustice, his sympathy for "poor Joshua" stick in memory. And in black ink. See Paul R.
Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the Cour Mirabeau, 43 AM. U. L. REV . 707
( 1 994).

Cf Shakespeare' s "B lack Ink" Sonnet, No. 65 ("unless this miracle have might,
That in black ink
shine bright"), in THE SONNETS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (Royal

my love may still

Shakespeare Theatre ed., Paddington Press 1 974).

84. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMO
CRATIC CONSTITUTION

(Alfred A. Knopf2005 ).

85. 539 U.S. 5 5 8 (2003), overruling Bowers v . Hardwick, 478
U . S . 1 86 ( 1 986).
86. 264 U.S. 504 ( 1 924) (citing Lochner v. New York, 1 98
U.S. 45 ( 1 905)) (Nebraska statute
.
regulatmg the size of loaves of bread held unconstitutional
as an arbitrary restriction of liberty ) .
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MR. EMERSON : That's correct.

309

They're both due process; they're

both due process.
Trying to escape Hugo Black ' s c lutches, Mr. Emerson hurriedly
87
distinguishes Lochner v. New York and reminds the Court o f Meyer v.
88
Nebraska:
MR. EMERSON: But it is not broad due process in the sense in which
the issue was raised in the 1 930s.

I n the first place, this is not a

regulation that deals with economic or commercial matters.

It is a

regulation that touches upon individual rights: the right to protect life
and health, the right o f advancing scientific knowledge, the right to
h�ve children v �luntarily.

And therefore, we say we are not askin�
8
.
this Court to revive Lochner agamst New York, or to overrule Nebbia
90
or West Coast Hotet.
JUSTICE BLACK: It sounds to me like you ' re asking us to follow the

constitutional philosophy of that case.
MR. EMERSON: No, your Honor, we are not.

We are asking you to

follow the philosoph¥ of Meyer against Nebraska and Pierce against
the

Society of Sisters,

1

which dealt with-Meyer against Nebraska-

JUSTICE BLACK: That's the one that held it was unconstitutional, as I

recall it, for a state to try to regulate the size of loaves of breadMR. EMERSON: No, no-JUSTICE BLACK: -to keep people from being defrauded; was that it?

MR. EMERSON: That was the Lochner case, your Honor. . . .
The Nebraska case Justice Black has i n mind is not Lochner v. New
York, not at all . B oth the Justice and the Professor, not to put too fine a
point on it, are all mixed up.
Burns Baking Company

v.

bread is sold," per Butler, J

The case is a n old favorite of my teaching,

Bryan
Th e loaf is the usual form in which
92
Be that as it may, E lizabeth B lack was in the
-"

.

wives' box when her husband, chastising the Court for its errant ways,
announced his dissent i n Griswold

v.

Connecticut orally from the bench.

Mrs. Black recorded in her diaries, "Hugo was e loquent. Wish everybody

87. 198 U.S. 45 ( 1 905).
88. 262 U.S. 390 ( 1 923).
89. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 ( 1 934).
90. W. Co ast Hotel, Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 ( 1 937).
91. 268 U.S. 5 1 0 ( 1 925).
92. Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 5 1 3 ( 1 924).
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s!"
could have heard him. I think it w i l l b e one of his great dissent
was right. Judge for yourself:

93

She

The Court talks about a constitut ional "right of privacy" as though
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbiddin g any law
ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" o f individuals.

There are, of course, guarantees in certain specific
constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy
at certain times and places with respect to certain activities. Such, for
But there is not.

example, is the Fourth Amendment ' s g uarantee against "unreasonable
searches and seizures." But I think it belittles that Amendment to talk

about it as though it protects nothing but privacy. To treat it that way
is to give it a niggardly interpretation, not the kind of liberal reading I
94
think any Bill of Rights provision should be given.
And more:
I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional "right to

privacy" as an emanation from one or more constitutional provisions.

I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless

compelled to admit that the government has a right to invade it unless
95
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.
Having dispatched the Court' s reliance on the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments-al l the hodgepodge of Justice Douglas's
majority opinion-Justice Black puts h i s dagger into Justice Harlan' s due
process nonsense:
I do not believe we are granted power by the Due Process C lause or
other constitutional provision or provlSlons to measure
constitution ality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or

any

unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive to
our own notions of "civilized standards o f conduct." Such an a ppraisal
of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make laws
96
'
not the power to interpret them.

93. HUGO L . BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUSTIC
E AND MRS. BLACK : THE MEMOIRS OF
HUGO L. LACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 1 16 (Paul
R. Baier, ed., Random House 1 986) .
94 .Gns"".old v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-09
(1965) (B lack J, with whom Stewart, J.
. .
JOms, d1ssentmg).

�

.

,

95. Id. at 509-10 (footnote

omitted) .
96. Id. at 5 1 3 (footnote omitted).
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D. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT
4. IN RE WINSHIP, OCTOBER TERM, 1969.

97

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment really puts the
Court on the brink. Whether "fundamental fairness" is the measur e of "due
process" is an o l d tug of war rehearse d on the Oyez Project. In

re

Winship,

October Term, 1 969, holds that in all criminal proceedings proof of must be
"beyond a reasonable doubt," and not a
evidence.

At oral argument, Justice

mere preponderance of the

B l ac k decries any reliance on

"fundamental fairness." His due process p h i l osophy abhors such a vagary.
Listen to his mellifluous voice yourself-"sweet home Alabama":
JUSTICE BLACK: I understood that the only question you brought up,

the only question you raised, the only question the court decided was
whether or not an infant could be found guilty of an offense on proof
of a mere preponderance of evidence, or whether you had to prove it
beyond a reasonable doubt.
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes, Mr. Justice Black. I'm only trying to,
uh,JUSTICE BLACK: I say though, isn ' t that the only question before us?
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes, yes it isJUSTICE BLACK: And whether the Constitution requires it be beyond a

reasonable doubt?
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes, that ' s right.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: You know of any constitutional prohibition

against this Court deciding that the preponderance of the evidence
should be the rule in all full-scale criminal cases, in all the states? And
in the federal courts? What in the Constitution would prohibit that?
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Nothing would prohibit it.

I would think

we 're determining what is the concept of a fair trial.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I'm not in favor of it you understand, I ' m

just asking whether we have the power t o d o it?
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes, you do I would think.

97. Jn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 ( 1 970). This one, I'm sad to say, is not in the Landmark
Rrief.i· and Arguments series. De gustibus non est disputandum. To listen to the oral argument in
ll 'i11ship, excerpted in Part III.D.4., see Recording of Oral Argument, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
1 J 970), hrtp://oyez.org/cases/1 960-1969/1 969/ 1 969_778.
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Well, class, what provision of the Constitution requires "proof beyond
a reasonable

doubt" in all

Amendment?

No, i t ' s not there.

' Proof Beyond

a

criminal

Reasonable

Fessenden can' t find it.

cases?

What about

the

Sixrh

"Mr. Fessenden, where d o y o u find 1h1.:

Doubt

Clause'

in

the

"Snodgrass, what d o you say?"

Constituti o n · ' "
Snodgrass.

1111

dullard, exclaims dutifully: "It's in the Due Process Clause, Professor."
The tapes, you will hear, provide instant professional reinforcemcnr
This is a good thing because educational theorists tell us that reinforcemcnl
is important to learning. "Snodgrass, you are in good company." Enter l\f r
Justice Byron White:
JUSTICE WHITE: You're relying o n the Due Process Clause?
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ. : Yes, I am.
JUSTICE WHITE: As compared to the idea of a fair trial, "fundamental
fairness"?
RENA K. UVILLER, ESQ.: Yes.
Snodgrass got it right.
On the other hand, Stanley Buchsbaum, Esq., who argued the caus1..·

1111

behalf of the City of New York, stumbles over Justice Hugo B l a1..·k · ,
mellifluous hypothetical:
JUSTICE BLACK: May I ask you one or two questions to clarify in my

mind on what you are saying. Suppose this child had not been a child

but had been twenty-five years old and charged with a crime. Do you
think the Constitution requires the proof to convict-constitutional ly.

I'm not talking about anything but the Constitution-requires proof to

be shown beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt?
STANLEY BUCHSBAUM, ESQ.: To put it, Your Honor put it, "Charged
with a crimeJUSTICE BLACK: "Charged with a crimeSTANLEY BUCHSBAUM, ESQ.: "Charged with a crimeJUSTICE BLACK: The measure of proof.

Do you think that the

Constitution requires that his proof of guilt be shown beyond a

reasonable doubt, or that it could be satisfied by showing he's guilty
by a preponderance of the evidence?
STANLEY BUCHSBAUM, ESQ.: I have found no case that decides that

issue. I would be inclined to think that this Court, probably, if faced
with that issue, would reach the conclusion that it must be proof
beyond a reasonable. I think it would say that-

2009)
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JUSTICE BLACK: Well, they'd have to do that on the basis of a criteria

that I don't agree to, of course, which is a question of fairness. That we

have a right to decide what's "fair," and if we decide it's not fair, to
say it's unconstitutional.

JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Not necessarily, because if you took the reasoning
of Judge Fuld in New York, in his dissent in this case, you would
say-or could argue at least-that the requirement of a finding

"beyond a reasonable doubt" is necessary to maintain the integrity of

the Fifth Amendment, unless a juvenile is not a "person" within the

meaning of the Fifth Amendment.

"What, Fessenden, does Justice Douglas have in mind?"

"How,

Myers, does the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt maintain the
integrity of the Fifth Amendment?" We are back in class.
E. EQUAL PROTECTION, VOTING RIGHTS

5. GRA Y V. SANDERS, OCTOBER TERM, 1962.98
The Warren Court, we know, condemned the Georgia "county unit"

system of voting for statewide officials as a denial of equal protection of the

laws . It skews elections of, let's say, Georgia's Governor in favor of rural

counties and peanut farmers.

The voters in Fulton County and its great

metropolis Atlanta are denied equal voting strength, as they far outnumber

the sparsely populated rural counties, yet each is given equal voting
strength in statewide elections regardless of population.

Gray

v.

Sanders

comes midway between Baker v. Carr, which sustained jurisdiction, and
99
Reynolds v. Sims, which condemns on the merits. The equal protection
principle of Gray

v.

Sanders as Justice Douglas voices it in the United
00
States Reports is "one person, one vote."1
All of which I expect my
students to know, just as I expect them to know the multiplication tables.

But beyond doctrine, the sounds of Attorney General Robert Kennedy

Gray v. Sanders, his only appearance at the Bar of the Supreme
ft
Court, 01 give us more-Inspiration, Youth, Hope, Conviction.
Robert

arguin

98. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 ( 1 963). To listen to the oral argument in Gray, excerpted in

Part III.E.5., see Recording of Oral Argument, Gray v. Sanders,

372 U.S.

368

( 1 963),

http://www.oyez.org/cases/l 960-l 969/l 962/ 1 962_ 1 1 2 .
99. 377 U.S. 533 (1 964).

100. "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing--0ne person, one vote." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 ( 1 963).
1 0 1 . "It had become a custom for Attorneys General to argue one case in person at the summit.
Even had there been no such custom, Kennedy would have wished to appear before the Court."
ARTffiJR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 396 (Houghton Mifflin 1 978).
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Kennedy's plea for equality in voting rights was his only appearance as a
lawyer in any court. There were more Kennedys in the Supreme Court than
.

.

Justices when Bobby Kennedy argued the Georgia county-umt case.

102

Archibald Cox, who was then Solicitor General, guided Attorney General
Kennedy 's preparation, 103 modeling at the highest level.

Our Master's Voice-Holmes, remember-tells us that the only thing
that matters when you finish law school is whether you have any "fire in
Inspiration counts for much i n this fire department.

your belly."

Kennedy's p eroration in Gray v.
conviction, passion, hope.

You hear Robert Kennedy 's soft knock, knock,

knocking of the rostrum as he finishes his argument.
miracle

of

the

Oyez

Robert

You hear youth,

Sanders inspires.

Project

the

sounding

You hear the great

"great

miracle

of the

Constitution":

ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY: When the Constitution
was written we didn't have decisions on due process or commerce
between the states or freedom of speech.

But we made important

progress in all of these fields under the general umbrella of the
Constitution and under the guidance of the Supreme Court.

When

George Washington was President, you didn't have railroads, you
didn't have automobiles, let alone j et aircraft. But the great miracle of
the Constitution is that we've been able to deal with the problems of
the Twentieth Century, as well as the problems of the Eighteenth
Century.

These are the great problems that are facing the United

States [knocking] at the present time.

And this kind of invidious

practice that exists now [knocking] and has existed before in the
Georgia county-unit system, strikes [knocking] at the very heart of the
United States.

If we can give equal protection to those who feel they

have been denied their economic rights, certainly we can give equal
protection to those who have been deprived of the most basic right of
all [knocking], which is the right to vote [knocking] .

If we cannot

"The obvious field was civil rights. But 'I had done so much in civil rights,' Kennedy recalled. ' I
was up to my ears in civil rights . . . s o I selected a n apportionment case."' Id.

102. "The Kennedys, it was observed, outnumbered the justices."

I 01, at 399.

SCHLESINGER, supra note

103. "The best argument for you to make will be whatever you, yourself, find most persuasive . .

. .

The burden of convincing the Court that i s just wrong-wrong-WRONG will come at oral

argument, for the point is just as much emotional as rational." Id. at 398. Archibald Cox said of
Robert Kennedy 's legal intuition:
He did not know a great deal about case law. But he had the quality Hugo Black had so
strongly. I would present a technical problem to him in technical terms-very often
a
pro�lem remote from his training or experience-and he could put his finger at once
on the
gut issue.

Id. at 40 1 .
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protect them, then the whole fabric of the American system, of our
way of life [knocking], is irreparably damaged. Thank you.
A n assassin's bullet muted Robert Kennedy' s voice, sadly. The Oyez
104
it for us, gladly.

Project saves

F. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, PENTA GON PAPERS CASE
6. NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. UNITED STA TES, OCTOBE R TERM, 1 970.105

Now for our promised Pine Street reprise-legal fireworks-of Dean
106
Griswold and Justice Hugo Black's confrontation, forehead to forehead,

voice

to voice, during oral argument in the Pen tagon Papers Case.

You

will recall that Solicitor General Griswold sought a federal court injunction
grounds of national security prohibiting the New York Times and the

on

Washington

Post

from publishing the

Pentagon Papers,

stamped "Top Secret" by the military.
Amendment?

which were

Well, what about the First

What about freedom of the press?

Justice Thurgood

Marshall fires the first rocket, loudly audible to the ear.

This time his

minimalism is aimed at Solicitor General Griswold. Let's listen in:

JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, wouldn't we, then, be-the federal courts,

be the censorship board?

I 04.
mv

I did not find Gray

v.

Sanders, October Term, 1 962, on the Oyez Project when composing

Pinc Street Phonograph. I used a recording I had mined myself out of the National Archives.

llirn:aftcr, I wired Goldman:

"What, Gray v. Sanders is missing from the Oyez Juke Box!

I

111�an Robert Kennedy's only argument in any court as a lawyer under the guidance of Archibald
Soli c itor General, who got Bobby ready."

< ox.

I begged, "Oh Great Wizard, call the tune up

pkasc." The Oyez Man responded instantaneously. Said my new friend Jerry Goldman:
My dear Wollensak:

Plucking old chestnuts from the fire again! We just received our copy of the entire
1962 Term (220 reels of content!) And I shall cherry-pick this one for your pleasure.
At our age, we take pleasure where we can. I will also advance it in the queue for
transcription and alignment, using our new tools to enable you and your students to
improve the record.
I ·mail from Jerry Goldman, founder and creator of The Oyez Proj ect, to author (Dec. 05, 2008
•1 �2 CST) (on file with author) (reprinted with permission).
1 05. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 7 1 3 ( 1 97 1). To read the transcript of the.
11ral argument in N. Y Times Co, excerpted in Part III.F.6., see Transcript of Oral Argument, New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.

7 1 3 ( 1 9 7 1 ), in 71 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND

·\R!il.'MENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 1 3
1 Philip

8 . Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds.,

Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1975). To listen to the oral

.ir cument in N. Y Times Co., excerpted in Part III.F.6, see Recording of Oral Argument, New York

r1�cs

Co.

v.

United

States,

403

U.S.

713

( 1 971),

http://oyez.org/cases/1970-

l <l79il 970/1 970_ 1 87 3 .
1 06. Cf Coy v . Iowa, 487 U.S. 1 0 1 2, 1 0 1 5 - 1 6 ( 1 98 8 ) (holding that Sixth Amendment right of
.:nnfrontation "existed under Roman law . . . simply as a matter of Latin as well, since the word
":onfront' ultimately derives from the prefix
"ipposed') and the noun 'frons' (forehead)").
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MR. SOLICITOR GENERAL ERWIN N. GRISWOLD: That's a pejorative
way to put it, Mr. Justice. I don't know what the alternative is.
JUSTICE BLACK: The First Amendment might be.
[General laughter.]
MR. GRISWOLD: Yes, Mr. Justice, and we are, of course, fully
supporting the First Amendment.
[Laughter.]
Dean Griswold knows how to stand up to laughter, another essential
professional skil l :
MR. GRISWOLD: We do not claim, or suggest, any exception to the
First Amendment, and we do not agree with Mr. Glendon, when he
says that we set aside the First Amendment, or that Judge Gesell or the
two courts o f appeals in this case, have set aside the First Amendment
by issuing the injunction which they have.
Well, Myers, how can it be that our friend the Solicitor General is not
suggesting any exception to the First Amendment? We test Myers against
Erwin N. Griswold, sixth in C. C . Langdell ' s line:
MR. GRISWOLD: The problem in this case is the construction of the
First Amendment.

Now, Mr. Justice Black, your construction of the

First Amendment is well known, and I certainly respect it.

You say

that "no law" means "no law," and that should be obvious.
JUSTICE BLACK: l rather thought that.
MR. GRISWOLD : And I can only say, Mr. Justice, that to me it is
equally obvious that "no law" does not mean "no law," and I would
seek to persuade the Court that that is true. As Chief Justice Marshall
said so long ago, it is a Constitution that we are interpreting. And all
we ask for here is the construction o f the Constitution, in the light of
the fact that there are other parts o f the Constitution which grant
powers and responsibilities to the Executive, and that the First
Amendment was not intended to make it impossible for the Executive
to function, or to protect the security of the United States.
Through Erwin Griswold, viva voce, we hear an echo of the past, the
voice of the Great Chief Justice John Marshall: "[W]e must never forget.
1 07
that it is a constitution we are expounding."
But is McCulloch \'.
Maryland an apt precedent? What is the place of John Marshall and James

1 07. McCulJoch

v.

Maryland, 17

U.S.

(4 Wheat.) 3 1 6, 407 ( 1 8 1 9).
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McCulloch in the context of the New York Times and the Pentagon Papers?
What is the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause, if any, in this
Ex ecutive Branch/First Amendment clash of interests? Later on in my class
108
at LSU Law School, Dean Griswold, "live and in person,"
supplements
his Pentagon Papers argument by telling us of the wisdom of Justice
1 09
Jackson' s dissent in Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
from Justice

Douglas' s opinion of the Court in a free speech case that borders on a riot.
The majority opinion, said Justice Jackson,
[F]ixes its eyes on a conception of freedom of speech so rigid as to
tolerate no concession to society' s need for public order. . . .
choice is not between order and liberty.
order and anarchy without either.

The

It is between liberty with

There i s danger that, if the Court

does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it
1 10
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.
A vital lesson, to be sure.

Next, the voice of Alexander Mordecai Bickel, Chancellor Kent
Professor of Law and Legal History, the Yale Law School, counsel of
record for the New York Times. Yal e ' s Professor Bickel is a sharp foil to
Harvard's Erwin N. Griswold.

I want my students to hear the sounds of
111
Harvard and Yale clashing at the Supreme Court-"the j oust"
of First
Amendment principles. This is modeling at our lower level.
i n class, I let the tapes do the talking.

At this point

Things get started when one of my

favorite, no-nonsense judicial personalities j oins us in class. This is Justice
Potter Stewart, who is pure Yale.

I first laid eyes on him and heard his

voice when I worked at the Court during the Bicentennial of the American
Revolution a generation ago. I listened to many arguments during my year
as a Judicial Fellow. They improved my mind. Justice Stewart, I submit, is
a

pretty good C. C. Langdell, albeit from Yale. He asks good questions of

the lawyers at Court. All law professors use hypotheticals in class.

Why

not have Justice Stewart in class asking one of his own:
JUSTICE STEWART: Let me give you a hypothetical case.

Let us

assume that when the members of the Court go back and open up this
sealed record, we find something there that absolutely convinces us
that its disclosure would result in the sentencing to death of a 1 00
young men whose only offense had been that they were 1 9 years old,

1 08. Television interview with Etwin N. Griswold, A

Life Lived Greatly in the Law: Erwin N.

Griswold (WLSU TV, 1980) (produced by P. R. Baier).
1 09. 337 U.S. 1 ( 1 949).
1 1 0.

ld. at 14, 3 7 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

1 1 1 . Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 3 97, 4 1 8 ( 1 989) ("We decline, therefore, to create for the flag
an

exception to the joust of principles protected by the First Amendment") (Brennan, J. ).
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and had low draft numbers. What should we do?
MR. BICKEL: Mr. Justice, I wish there were a statute that covered it.
JUSTICE STEWART: Well, there isn ' t, we agree-or you submit-so
I'm asking in this case, what should we do?
Over the years my students, i n answeri ng Justice S te w art' s question
that
before they hear Professo r Bicke l ' s response , sometim es insist
This
"freedom of the press" requires pub lication, with no ifs, ands, o r buts.

is Hugo B lack ' s absolutism and it is a false teaching to my l i ghts. I prefer
1 12
or Justice Jackson ' s voice. Or listen to the N e w York Times'
Holmes ' s,
counsel of record:
MR. BICKEL: I 'm addressing a case which I am as confident as I can
be of anything, your Honor will not find that when you get back to
your chambers. It's a hard case. I think it would make bad separation
of powers law, but it's almost impossible to resist the inclination not to
let that information be published, of course.
JUSTICE STEWART: As you know-as I ' m sure you do know-the
concern that this Court has, term after term, with people who ' ve been
convicted and sentenced to death--convicted of extremely serious
crimes-you know that the-in capital cases-and I ' m p o sing you a
case where the disclosure of something in these files would result in
the death of people who were guilty of nothing.
MR. BICKEL: You're posing me a case, of course, Mr. Justice, in
which that element of my attempted definition which refers to the
chain of causationJUSTICE STEW ART: I suppose in the great big global picture this is
no-this is not a national threat.
MR. BICKEL: No, sir.
JUSTICE STEWART: There are at least 25 Americans killed in Vietnam
every week, these days.
MR. BICKEL: No, sir, but I meant it's a case in which the chain of
causation between the act of publication and the feared event-the
death of these 100 young men-is obvious, direct, immediate-

1 1 2. To quote :
All. rights tend t� declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet
all in fact are
hm1�ed by t�e neighborhood of principles of policy which are other
than those on which the
part1�ular nght 1s founded, and which become strong enough to hold their
own when a
_
certam pomt ts reached.
Hudson Water C o.

v.

McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 3 5 5 ( 1 908) (Holmes, J.).
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JUSTICE STEWART: That's what I ' m assuming in my hypothetical

case .
MR. BICKEL: I could only say, as to that, that it is a case in which, in

the absence of a statute, I suppose most of us would sayJUSTICE STEWART: You would say the Constitution requires that it be

published, and that these men die? Is that it?
MR. BICKEL: No.

inclinations

to

No, I'm afraid I ' d have-I' m afraid that, my

humanity overcome

the

somewhat more abstract

devotion to the First Amendment in a case of that sort.
Another vital lesson-the interplay o f black ink and humanity-from
the voice of the past. Alexander Bickel, sadly, died much too young, at the
height of his powers. But his mind lives on, on tape-Oyez, Oyez, Oyez !
Chief Justice Burger tunes in at this point. He alters the hypothetical a
little bit:
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Professor Bickel, let me alter the i l lustration

a little bit, the hypothetical.

Suppose the information was sufficient

that judges could be satisfied that the disclosure of a link-the identity
of a person engaged in delicate negotiations having to do with the
possible release of prisoners of war-that the disclosure of this, would
delay the release of those prisoners for a substantial period of time?
Now I am posing that so that it is not "immediate." Is that, or is that
not, in your view, a matter that should stop the publication, and
therefore avoid the delay in the release of the prisoners?
MR. BICKEL: Mr. Chief Justice, on that question-which is, of course,

a good deal nearer to what's bruited about anyway in the record of this
case-I can only say that . . . I think Mr. Chief Justice, that, that is a
risk that the First Amendment signifies that this society is willing to
take. That is part of the risk of freedom that I would certainly take.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I get a feeling from what you have said

although you haven't addressed yourself directly to it-that you do not
weigh heavily,

or

think the

courts

should

weigh

heavily,

the

impairment of sources of information, either diplomatic or military
intelligence sources?
MR. BICKEL: Mr. ChiefCHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Now
MR. BICKEL: I am sorry.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: I get the impression that you wouldn't
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consider that enough to warrant an inj unction.
MR. BICKEL: In the circumstances of th is case, Mr. Chief Justice, I

think it-I ' m perfectly clear in my mind that the President, without
statutory authority-no statutory basis-goes into court and asks for
an inj unction, on that basis, that if Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Company

v.

Sawyer

1 13

"
h e does not get 1t.
.
means anyth mg,

Remember, as I said earlier,

it' s

important to know the Court 's

precedents. Or, as Colonel Wiener says, "Nothing shuts up a j udge like an
1 14
apt citation."
Chief Justice Burger i s unperturbed by Bickel ' s precedent.
He plows ahead:
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Well then, now let meMR. BICKEL: Now, whether under a statute, we don't face it in this

case and I really don't know. I ' d have to face that if I saw it-if I saw
the statute-i f ! saw how definite it was.
JUSTICE

DOUGLAS:

Why would the statute make a difference?

Because the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law abridging freedom of the press"?
MR. BICKEL: WellJUSTICE DOUGLAS: You can read that to mean Congress may make

"some laws" abridging freedom of the press?
MR. BICKEL: No, sir-only in that I have conceded, for purposes of

this argument,

that

some

limitation,

some

impairment

of the

absoluteness of that prohibition, is possible. And I argue that whatever
that may be-whatever that may be-it is surely at its very least when
the President acts without statutory authority, because that inserts into
it, as well as separation of powersJUSTICE DOUGLAS: That's a very strange argument for The Times to

be making, that Congress can make all this i llegal by passing laws.
MR. BICKEL: Well, I really didn' t argue that Mr. Justice.

At least I

hope not.
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Well, that was the strong impression you left in

my mind.
You can judge for yourself whether this Harvard/Yale tug of war over

1 1 3. 343 U.S. 579 ( 1 952).
1 1 4. PAUL R. BAIER & Co., THE POCKET CONSTITUTIONALIST xxi (Silver Anniversary 5th ed.,
Claitor's 2003) (quoting Ex rel. Frederick Bernays Wiener, from his desk in sunny retirement,
2822 East Osborn Road, Apt. I 03, Phoenix, Arizona).
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the meaning o f the First Amendment i n the Pentagon Papers Case leaves a
strong impression i n your mind. Surely it adds life to our learning.
G. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
7. MAPP V. OHIO, OCTOBER TERM, 1960.

115

The roots of Mapp v . Ohio lie deep beneath the surface of Justice Tom
Clark's

opinion

for the

Court.

Constitutional

advocacy

determines

constitutional outcomes, usually. But sometimes the Oyez Proj ect yields a
blank tape, or almost a blank tape, or at best a cacophony of Court and
counsel.

We must look elsewhere to expose the roots of Mapp.

Counsel

for Dolree Mapp, A. L. Keams, Esq., is none too clear as to whether he
wants the Court to overrule Wolf v. Colorado.

1 16

He doesn' t say so. Sharp

questioning from Justice Frankfurter leaves Mr. Keams scratching his head.
He recurs to the facts.

Only the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus

curiae, is heard on the Oyez Project urging that Wolf v. Colorado be
reconsidered.

Most of the Oyez audio concerns the scope of Ohio's

criminal obscenity statute as it reaches private possession in the home. On
the other side, Gertrude Bauer Mahon, Esq., Criminal Courts Building,
Cleveland, Ohio, tells the Court, "Now, we are relying on the Wolf case . . .
the State of Ohio, . . . we have a right to rely on your decision in Wolf case
117
and on your decis i on in the Roth
case, if there is anything to the doctrine
of stare decisis . . . . " The Court sits i n utter silence. No justice challenges
her reliance o n Wolf v. Colorado in any way.

The Exclusionary Rule of

Mapp v. Ohio, respectfully, is an echo of the past not heard on the Oyez
Project. To understand its origin, we must listen to the Texas voice of Tom
Clark. He recurs to what Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes used to say.
The voice of the past thus echoes down to us for good or ill, a s we have
heard.
I have elsewhere reported a field trip to the Court and a conversation
1 18
We were a small

with Justice C lark in the East Conference Room.

seminar: the Justice, a busload of law students, and their teacher. We asked
Justice Clark what was the most difficult thing about being on the Supreme

I 15. Mapp v. Ohio, 3 6 7 U.S. 643 ( 1 96 1 ). To read the transcript of the oral argument in Mapp,
excerpted in Part III. G . 7., see Transcript of Oral Argument, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 196 1 ),
in 55 LANDMARK BR1EFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
I 1 5 7 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. , Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1 975). To listen to the oral
argument in Mapp, excerpted in Part !II.G.7., see Recording of Oral Argument, Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S 643 ( 1 96 1 ), http://oyez.org/cases/! 960-l 969/l 960/1 960_236.
.
J 1 6. 338 U.S. 25 ( 1 949).
1 1 7. 354 U.S. 476 ( 1 957).
1 1 8. Paul R. Baier, Justice Clark, the Voice of the Past, and the Exclusionary Rule, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 415 ( 1 9 85).
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"1 19

Court. "Well, I suppose all the hullabaloo they make o v e r you.

brought a tape recorder along and aske d Justice Clark whether I could
.
record his remarks. He didn 't mind a t all. At the time, I knew nothing of
1 20
Paul Thompson's The Voice of the Past: Oral History.
"[H] istory can
121
help people see how they stand, and where they shoul g o . "
Sho ly aft�r

�

�

our taped conversation, Justice Clark died. He had given us the gift of his
voice's teaching. He talked about Mapp

v.

Ohio, the exclusionary rule, and

the role of j udicial heroes in giving shape to our law. Was Mapp the one
opinion he was most proud of?
JUSTICE CLARK: I don't know about Mapp being my most, the one
I'm most proud of.

I am proud of it, because the idea o f Mapp just

shocked me. When I was a kid I came out of the University of Texas.
I went back to Dallas and tried to practice a little law and I picked up a
few cases, and one of them was our cook's. We had a cook-believe it
or not-for seven dollars a week. We paid her a dollar a day.

That

was the going wage, for cooks. And her son was a nice little fellow,
but got into trouble. They found a half-a-pint of com whiskey, during
prohibition, in his house he had on Elm Street. And they cut open the
mattress; they didn't have a search warrant or anything; they just took
a knife and cut the mattresses open, took crow bars and pulled the
baseboards away from the wall-just a terrible thing for these police
officers to do. Then they carried the half-a-pint on a "silver platter," as
they called it, over to the federal court, not to the state court, or the city
court, but to the federal court. And so I filed a motion to quash. And I
think I was about like that fellow who was arguing Mapp. And Atwell
said, Judge Atwell was the judge, and he said, "Aren't you familiar
with such-and-such case?"

And I said, "No." He said' "Well that's
'
one of my cases. Mr. Clerk, take Mr. Clark back there in my chambers

and show him Atwell No. 7." I found out he had bound his opinions in
Atwell 1 , Atwell 2, Atwell 3 [laughing]-just like the U. S. Supreme
Court does. And there was an opinion that said they would receive the

proceeds of an illegal search which was committed by state officers or
city officers, because the federals had no control over those officers
and it would be an untoward thing for a person to go free just b ecause'
of some technicality. So the Silver Platter Doctrine-the idea being
that the waiter carries things on a silver platter from the kitchen to the

1 1 9. Baier, supra note 1 1 8 .

120. THOMPSON, supra note 5 7 , a t 7-8.
1 2 1 . Id. at 2 2 5 .

[T] he real j stifii ation o f history i s not i n giving a
n immortality to a few of t h e old . I t is part
�
�
.
.
way m wh 1c hthe 1ivmg
understand their place and part in the world · . .
. And m
· givmg
· ·
a past, it
· aI so he lps them towards a future of their own making.
Id. at225-26.
of the
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dining room, and so you carried this whiskey on a "silver platter" over
from the police department over to the federal court.
knocked that down in that case just before Mapp. 1 22

Potter Stewart

Let me interj ect that the Silver Platter Doctrine met its demise upon
the convincing advocacy of Frederick Bernays Wiener, Esq., as well as the
sturdy judicial

personality of Potter

Stewart. 1 23

Often

constitutional

advocacy and j ud i c i al personality work in tandem, voice to voice, in
sounding constitutional outcomes.

S o metimes, however, advocacy and

judicial philosophy are at loggerheads, a s we hear on the Oyez Project.
United States v. Leon, 1 24 carves a "good faith" exception out o f Mapp v.

Ohio. Justice Brennan, di ssenting, speaks o f "the teaching of those Justices

who first formulated the exclusionary rule . .
what Tom Clark told my students.

. . " 1 25

My mind drifts back to

I treasure the voice of that humble

Texan's teaching:
JUSTICE CLARK: I couldn't understand why

Wolf v. Colorado said

that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, but it just didn ' t seem
to go all the way-in fact it was j ust an empty gesture, sort of like
what

Chief Justice

Hughes

used

to

say:

No

use

to

have

a

Constitution-it' s pretty, got all sorts of nice fringes around it, but it
doesn 't mean anything, just a piece of paper-unless you really live by
it and enforce it.

And so that's true with Mapp and the Fourth

Amendment.
IV. P E RORATION
The Supreme Court tapes-the sounds of the Court in action, viva
voce-proffer a deeper understanding o f the Court's p ublished opinions

and, beneath
adjudication .

them,

of the Court ' s judicial process

in

constitutional

The Oyez Project, we have heard, takes us beyond, and

beneath, Langdell ' s black ink. In doing s o it enlivens the human enterprise
of law via the human voice.
I should it make clear, as I did twenty-five years ago-a rising

Phoenix-that I am not advocating burning law reviews and contemporary
successors to James Bradley Thayer ' s monumental Cases on Constitutional
Law, with Notes

( 1 895),

first in its field after Langdell trumpeted his

122. Interview with Tom C. Clark, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States' East Conference Room Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C.,
May 3, 1 977) (recorded with the permi sion of Justice C lark) (transcript and recording on file with

�

author) .
123. Elkins

v.

United States, 364 U.S. 206 ( 1 9 60).

124. 468 U.S. 897 ( 1 984).
125. Id. at 935 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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founding faith a t Cambridge: "[T]he l a w is a science; . . . . a l l the available
1 26
Select law
materials of that science are contai n e d in printed books."
re
review articles are required reading i n my teaching, as they are everywhe

fi

of writing
else. Like every other self-respec ting law professor, I am guil
12
and a few
them myself And yes I assign The Court and Its Critics
'
1 29
'
'
12lr
as
to b orrow from Holmes s fleece,
other of my "legal papers,"
•

required reading. I use Dean Grisw o l d ' s Leary Lecture, Absolute Is in the
130
Like Christo p h er Columbus
as a foil to Justice Hugo B lack.
Dark,
own variety of casebook,
my
carry
I
Thayer,
Bradley
James
and
Langdell
131
to class, along with Chief Justice Burger' s
The Pocket Constitutionalist,
Bicentennial p ocket edition o f the Constitution.

I n thi s ,

I a m gladly

following Justice Hugo Black' s practice of always carrying a copy of the
1 32
It was as
Constitution with him, stuffed into o n e suit pocket or another.
essential to Hugo Black as his thin n e cktie.
Let me add that I use the tape s sparingly.

But like Stravinsky's

Firebird, every once in a while they add fire to my teaching.

Justice Potter

Stewart ' s hypothetical case put to A l exander Bickel in the Pentagon Papers
Case is a good example. I had a chance once in the Great Hall at the Court

126. SUTHERLAND, supra note I, at 1 7 5 (quoting THAYER, supra note 63).
127. Paul R. Baier, The Court and Its Critics, 7 8 A.B.A. J . 58 ( 1 992).
128. I'm no Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., b y any measure, but my Collected Legal Papers
would include, to name a rare few: The True Story of the Ohio Syllabus Rule, 1 980 YEARBOOK
SUP. CT. HIST. SOC ' Y 2 1 ( 1 980); Time and the Court, 38 LA. B. J. 9 ( 1 990); Mr. Justice Blackmun:
Reflections from the Cour Mirabeau, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 707 ( 1 994); The Blue and Gray as One:
Holmes and White on the Supreme Court, 24 LITIG. 76 ( 1 998); Holmes and Honors Law at LSU

JV, "Father Chief
Justice ": E.D. White and the Constitution, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. l (2005); Of Bakke's Balance.
Gratz and Grutter: The Voice ofJustice Powell, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1 955 (2004); The Supreme Court,
From the Great Hall to la Maison Franr;ais, 6 3 LA. L. REV. 53 (2003); Act

Justinian, and A n tonin Scalia-Twenty Years in R etrospect, 67 LA. L. REV. 489 (2007). For
Holmes' s legal papers, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (Harcourt,
Brace & Howe 1 920). Holmes has twenty-six legal papers and speeches in all.
129. HOLMES, supra note 128, at Preface ("these little fragments of my fleece that I have left
upon the hedges o f life").
130. Erwin N. Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the
Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167 ( 1 963).
1 3 1 . See generally BAIER, supra note 1 14 . For a review, see 0. W. Wollensak, Book Review,
65 LA. L. REV. 5 3 3 (2005). Justice John L. Weimer of the Louisiana Suprem e C ourt writes the
Foreword. Justice Weimer is one of my proudest boasts as his former teacher at LSU Law Center.
1 32. Martin Agronsky, CBS News, asked Justice Black during the first television interview
ever made with a sitting Supreme Court Justice, what he meant when he said, "It
is my belief that
there are 'absolutes ' in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose
by men who
knew what words meant and meant their prohibitions to be ' absolutes."' Elizabeth
Black in her
memorial portrait records that, "Hearing Martin's question prompted a smile from
Hugo, and he
reached for the Constitution he always carried i n his pocket, opened it, and began
to instruct his
listeners on how to read the Constitution." Elizabeth B lack, Hugo Black: A Memorial
Portrait,
YEARBOOK 1 982, SUP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y 72, 77 ( 1 982).
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to tell Justice Stewart about m y tapes method. This was at some reception,
I forget which. I told h im that each Spring Term at LSU Law he j oins us in

class to reprise his hypothetical to B i ckel, testing the limits, i f any, of the
First Amendment: "You would say that the Constitution requires that it be
published, and that these men die?

I s that it."

I explained to him that

before we hear the answer, I put a student i n Bickel's shoes at the podium
of the Court-pedagogically speaking. We hear my student' s answer first.
What was Justice Stewart ' s reaction?

I had better quote him exactly

as he put it to me in the Great Hall at the Supreme Court: "That' s a damn
good idea."
I have always admired Justice Stewart' s succinct and sound judgment.

He was a good judge, j ust as he wanted to be remembered. As a teacher of
the Constitution, I ' m glad to have Justice Stewart in class, at Baton Rouge,
challenging Professor Bickel and my students, just as Socrates challenged
the young of his day, at Athens, circa 425 B . C .
A quarter o f a century ago, at Phoenix, i t was said I was hopelessly
corrupting the young by virtue of the drama and emotion of the Supreme
Court's tapes.

It was urged in all apparent seriousness that "we ought to

strip it all off and pour [cynical] acid on constitutional law in order to stay
133
with the scholar ' s task as against that of the dramatic presentor."
After another quarter of a century using choice fragments of Supreme
Court Socratic tapes (SCST) in class, and assigning a few landmark oral
arguments i n full for listening after hours, I remain convinced that the
sounds of the Supreme Court-the Voice of the Past-should be heard as a
best practice in our classrooms, from Harvard Law School to Pepperdine on
the Pacific-"from the St. Croix to the Gulph of Mexico, from the Atlantic
1 34
to conjure Chief Justice Marshall ' s voice of the past.

to the Pacific , "

With great respect to the Old Guard, I say again that my students and their
teacher prefer the life of the tapes to cynical acid poured on constitutional
135
Let me repeat myself after twenty-five years using the tapes method
law.
in class:

"[A]

great gap separates c lassroom constitutional law from

courtroom constitutional law. A pure theorist might ask, ' So what? ' I have
no fancy explanation, except that the real world is more interesting to me,
1 33. Baier, supra note 4, at 6 3 5. I had better leave my nemesis unnamed, so as to avoid self
incrimination.

"It was in this spirit of bulldog opacity that the scholastic philosophers failed to

meet the challenge of the printed book in the sixteenth c entury. The vested interests of acquired
knowledge and conventional wisdom have always been by-passed and engulfed by new media."
McLUHAN, supra note 7, at

1 95.
1 3 4 . McCulloch v. Maryland, 1 7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 3 1 6, 408 (1819).
135. "Perhaps the Old Guard is right; perhaps the old pedagogy is the best pedagogy. Each of
us, however, is obliged to forge our own way." Baier, supra note 4, at 635.
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1 6
and I want to share it with my students." 3 The Oyez Proj ec t is not only a
magnetic attraction, it is a magical toolbox.

"What one feature of my

teaching do you find of greatest benefit?" I ask my students.
on the
The first day I heard oral arguments before the Supreme Court
tapes. This was my first real taste of the lawyer' s problem s. It seems
as though the first-year of law school is an endurance test, rather than a

place to learn and perfect the skills and knowledge required to be the
.
1 37
best lawyer you are capable of b ecommg.

Christopher Columbus Langdell, surely a discoverer, was criticized
bitterly b� colleagues and students alike for his new-fangled "case
1
method." 8 He remained silent. Or, as was his best practic e , he would ask
1 39
For myself, I
a question himself of his interlocutor. This irritated people.
proffer the proofs o f the Pine Street Phonograph. As Wigmore says, "Res
140
ipsa locquitur" -tbe tapes speak for themselves.
Above all else, by way of peroration, may I say as a teacher of
constitutional law that the merry tales of the Court, the melody, the
laughter, the rhythmic dance, the music-the voices of the Supreme Court,
past, present, and future, enable us to teach law, in Holmes ' s phrase, "in the
grand manner, and to make great lawyers ."

"OYEZ, OYEZ, OYEZ." I hear

Holmes's voice whispering in my ear: "I think it a noble and pious thing to
do whatever we may by written word and molded bronze and sculptured
stone to keep our memories, our reverence , and our love alive and to hand
141
them on to new generations all too ready to forget."

1 36. Baier, supra note 4, at 625.

1 37. l am quoting a student's response to my course questionnaire. One question asks, "What

one class do you remember most and why?" A recent report of the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching urges "pedagogies of practice and professionalism that enable students
to shift from the role of students to that of apprentice professionals." SULLIVAN ET AL., s upra note

1 1 , at 77. The tapes method, inter alia, does just that.
1 38. "His lectures were followed by impromptu indignation meetings-'What do we care
whether Myers agrees with the case, or what Fessenden thinks of the dissenting opinion? What
we want to know is: What's the Law?"'

Samuel F . Batchelder, Christopher C. Langdell, 1 8

GREEN BAG 437, 440 (1906).

1 3 9. Langdell, wisely, may I say, ignored the opposition, although on many occasions he was

hard pressed to explain his new method: "On these occasions he became absorbed in thought and
seemed to falter. Usually he asked questions in reply." Franklin G . Fessenden, The Rebirth of the

Harvard Law School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 493, 501 (1 920).

140. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, IV A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE TN TRIALS AT

COMMON LAW §§ 2509, 3 5 56 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1905). Of course, Wigmore was talking tort
liability, while I am talking tapes.

1 4 1 . Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ipswich, At the Unveiling of Memorial Tablets ( 1 902), in THE

OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 1 3 6 (Mark deWolfe Howe, ed.,

Belknap Press of Harv. Univ. Press 1962).
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1 956, ON REHEARING, OCTOBER

I will leave the last selection of my RCA Victrola to a nestor of the
Supreme Court Bar, Frederick Bernays Wiener, Esq., whom I was lucky in
life to meet, first by ear in the Sound Recordings Division o f the National
Archives, later in person, with Doris Merchant Wiener at h i s side.
were living in sunny retirement i n Phoenix, Arizona.
Note Editor of the

They

Fritz Wiener was

Harvard Law Review at the height of the Coolidge Bull

Market, shortly before the stock market crash of 1 929. He was Reporter to
the Supreme Court Rules Committee under Chief Justice Earl Warren in
1 955.

He was William Hubbs Rehnquist ' s sponsor at the Bar of the

Supreme Court when Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, later Chief
Justice of the United States, headed the Justice Department' s Office of
Legal Counsel.
I had no letter of introduction, there was no advance telephone ca11
when I knocked on Colonel Wiener' s door at 2822 East Osborn Road, Apt.
103, Phoenix, Arizona 850 1 6 .

This was mid-way across America from

Washington, D . C . , where Fritz Wiener was a legend: "There Was a Giant in
143
the Land."
All I had were copies o f Colonel Wiener' s oral arguments in

Reid

v.

Covert-the first, defeat; the second, on rehearing, v ictory.

Otherwise Frederick B ernays Wiener did not know me from Adam.

The

tapes got me across the threshold. Such is their magic. "All I want to hear

142. Reid v. Covert, 3 54 U.S. l ( 1 957) (on rehearing). To read the transcript of the oral
reargument in Reid, excerpted in Part IV.8., see Transcript of Oral Argument, Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 {1 957),

in 52

LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

TIIE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 07 (Philip B. Kurland
Univ. Publ'ns of Am. 1 975). To listen to the oral reargument in

& Gerhard Casper eds . ,
Reid, excerpted in Part IV.8., see

Recording of Oral Argument, Reid v. Covert, 3 54 U . S . 1 (1 957), http:// oyez.org/cases/ 1 9501959/1955/ 1 955 701 2 .
143. Jacob A . Stein, a seasoned Washington, D.C., lawyer and a friend o f Fritz Wiener, so

captions his foreword to the revised edition of F. B . W . ' s masterpiece, FREDERICK BERNAYS
WIENER, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE A DVOCACY xvii (Christopher T. Lutz & Wi l liam Pannill eds.,
Am. Bar Ass'n 2003 ). Says Stein's openin g:
I first recall seeing Fritz Wiener at Connecticut Avenue and L Street in Washington, D.C., in
front of the Stoneleigh Court Building (no longer there), an attractive, old-fashioned
apartment house converted, with few changes, into an old-fashioned office building. . .
Although I did not know who Fritz was, I knew h e must be somebody. His posture was
militarily correct. He wore a cowboy hat that conflicted with his otherwise conservative
1930s double-breasted suit. He sported mustachios in an Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., style.

Id. A little later, Stein says of a passage from Colonel Wiener's slashing review of McNaughton's

revision of Wigmore on Evidence "This passage brings to mind Fritz's own definition of a
perfectionist: A person (Fritz) who takes infinite pains himself and gives infinite pain to others. "

Id. at xix (discussing Frederick Bernays Wiener, B o o k Review,

Evidence in Trials at

Common

Law, 75 HARV. L. REV. 44 1 ( 1 9 6 1 )). Jake Stein's foreword, like Fritz Wiener's swallowtail

is extraordinary.

coat,
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i s the peroration in Covert II."
Fritz Wiener welcomed me into his cozy study, lined with Selden
Society volumes, of which he was Vice-President for the Americas, both
North and South. "Uncle Fritz," as he later signed off on his many letters to
me, and precious Doris Merchant Wiener, as I came to know her-"best
144
-settled in.
The tapes fused a

friend and most perceptive critic"

friendship that lasted for over twenty years and saw many trips between
Phoenix and Baton Rouge and vice-versa.

I owe Fritz and Dori s Wiener

much. He is buried at the foot of Thunder Mountain, Sierra V ista, Arizona,
at Fort Huachuca, a U.S. Army military intelligence base.

I c ommend his

sturdy advocacy, his old-school courtesy, his erudition, his inestimable wit
to you. For legal scholarship, I recommend his Selden S o c iety lecture, The
145
Uses and Abuses of Le�fl History.
Or fo� real power, t1?' h i s Civili� ns
Under Military Justice.

Both are masterpieces of black mk.

Fredenck

Wiener's Effective Appellate A dvocacy, originally published in 1 9 5 0 , is the

locus classicus in its field, republished after fifty years by the American Bar

Association.

The original edition was l iterally stolen off library shelves.

I

paraded Colonel Wiener recently in an op-ed piece published in the
148
147
Washington Times,
the very day of the Hamdan
argument in the
Supreme Court. He was a ghost at the rostrum. I heard an echo o f his voice
as I sat in silence and listened to Neal Katyal ' s oral argument at the Court.
But my

time

is fleeting

and

I

must

conclude

our

Pine

Street

Production. I give heartfelt thanks to the Loyola Law Review and its Tug of
War Symposium Editor Samantha Siegel for inviting me and my RCA
Victrola to join your table. I salute my new friend Jerry Goldman, wizard
of the Oyez Proj ect.

I hope my l isteners agree that the Oyez Project's

sound effects-carefully composed for class-are a veritable
symphony.

S ocratic

S o too its dramatis personae-a living portrait gallery of the

voice of the past.

144. This is how Fritz Wiener dedicated his BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (The
Bureau ofNat'I Affairs 200 1 ) (1 967)-"For DORIS Best friend and most perceptive critic." She
was.
145. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, THE USES AND ABUSES OF LEGAL HISTORY, Selden
Society Lecture, delivered in the Old Hall of Lincoln's Inn, Mar. 29, 1 962 (London B ernard
Quaritch 1 962).
146. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE (Univ.
of Chicago
Press 1 967).
'

147. Paul R. Baier, The Laws of War: Should the Military Try al Qaeda?, WASH.
TIMES, Mar
28, 2006, at A23.
1 48 . Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). To listen to the Hamda
n oral argument, see
.
of Oral
Recording
Argument, Hamdan
v.
Rumsfeld,
548
U.S.
557
(2006) '
http:l/oyez.com/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_1 84.
.
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Let me conclude by playing Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener's
peroration in Reid v. Covert II-the advoc ate ' s dream come true.

For me,

this is Stravinsky' s "Final Hymn" from his Firebird. I proffe r it as a final
Advocate's Prayer, off Pine Street, Loyola University New Orleans College
of Law, Spring Term, 2009.
I hope you hear it the same way, and wil l keep the faith.
FREDERICK

BERNAYS WIENER,

ESQ. :

If your

Honors

please,

[arranges papers] I have tried to argue this case with some degree of
objectivity.

I have tried to put out of mind as nearly as I can the

callous and somewhat obtuse cruelty with which these two women
were treated, because I felt that I could best discharge my duty to this
Court, [sips water] as well as my duty to them, by dealing with this as
a question

of constitutional

law,

which

calls for research,

and

reflection, and cogitation.
But I cannot conceal my concern over the seriousness of what's
involved, because this, this is about as fundamental an issue as has
ever come before this Court, and certainly more vital and fundamental
in the constitutional sense than any that ' s been here for some years.
And it is fundamental and vital because it poses in stark immediacy the

question of how far we may properly brace ourselves to withstand
assault from without, and yet perhaps sow the seeds of our own
disintegration from within. Because we have here, I think for the first
time, a question involving the impact on the one hand of the supposed
needs of the garrison state upon ,

on the other, "the immutable

principles of a free nation."
That ' s a quotation, "The immutabl e principles of a free nation," not
from the writings of some cloistered libertarian philosopher, but from

the institution o f the Order of the Cincinnati, which was founded in
1 783 by the Revolutionary officers who had pledged their lives and

shed their blood that this country might b e born.
And I think [drinks water] we will be aided in the resolution of that
problem by considering two sentences from the late Mr. Justice
Cardozo's immortal classic, The Nature of the Judicial Process :
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The great ideals of liberty and equality are preserved against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and derision of those who
have no patience with general principles, by enshrining them in
constitutions, and consecrating to the task of their protection a body of
defenders.

By conscious or subconscious influence, the presence of

this restraining power, aloof in the background, but none the less
always in reserve, tends to stabilize and rationalize the legislative
judgment, to infuse it with the glow of principle, to hold the standard
aloft and visible for those who must run the race and keep the faith.
If your Honors please, I have been enrolled among the body of
defenders. I hope this Court will keep the faith.

If reading this you are not moved, you should hear it. I f hearing it you
are not moved, you are not a lawyer.

